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Abstract
We use a randomized experiment to compare a workforce training program to cash transfers
in Rwanda. Conducted in a sample of poor and underemployed youth, this study measures
the impact of the training program not only relative to a control group but relative to the
counterfactual of simply disbursing the cost of the program directly to beneficiaries. While
the training program was successful in improving a number of core outcomes (productive hours,
assets, savings, and subjective well-being), cost-equivalent cash transfers move all these outcomes
as well as consumption, income, and wealth. In the head-to-head costing comparison cash proves
superior across a number of economic outcomes, while training outperforms cash only in the
production of business knowledge. We find little evidence of complementarity between human
and physical capital interventions, and no signs of heterogeneity or spillover effects.
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Executive Summary
The Huguka Dukore/Akazi Kanoze program (meaning ‘Get Trained and Let’s Work/Work Well
Done’ in Kinyarwanda) is a five-year project (2017-2021) aimed at providing 40,000 vulnerable
youth with employability skills in 19 (of 30 total) districts in Rwanda. The program targets youth
ages 16-30 from poor households with less than secondary education, with an emphasis on women
and youth with disabilities. Huguka Dukore includes several interventions that aim to improve
workforce readiness through education, training, and on-the-job training or internship experiences.
Each of the three components of the program lasts 10 weeks, consisting of i) workforce readiness
preparation; ii) individual youth entrepreneurship and microenterprise start-up; and iii) technical
training for specific trades, after which trainees may be placed in apprenticeships. The program
builds on lessons learned from a randomized controlled trial (RCT) of the USAID-supported Akazi
Kanoze Youth Livelihoods Project, implemented by the Education Development Center.
This report details the 18-month midline results from an impact evaluation that benchmarked
Huguka Dukore to unconditional cash grants, provided via mobile money by the U.S. non-profit
GiveDirectly. Another round of data collection is planned that will measure impacts after 36-
months.
Methodology
A randomized controlled trial (RCT) was designed to measure the impact of the
Huguka Dukore relative to cash grants of the same cost to the funder, and also to
understand how any impacts compare to what would have happened in the absence of
the program(s). The evaluation was primarily interested in measuring impacts on the following
outcomes: i) beneficiary employment status, ii) time use, iii) beneficiary income, iv) household
consumption, and v) productive assets, but also looked at a range of secondary outcomes and
intermediate mechanisms, including business knowledge, savings, subjective wellbeing, and wealth.
The study enrolled poor, underemployed youth who expressed willingness to enroll in a training
program at baseline. Average yearly income in this population was about $190 a year on average.
Of 2,275 individuals who attended an orientation meeting and signed up for Huguka Dukore, 1,967
met the programs eligibility criteria. A further 119 could not be located either in the village of
their stated residence, leaving a total of 1,848 youth who were enrolled in the study. After a
baseline survey, conducted from December 2017-February 2018, thirteen public lotteries were used
to randomly assign the youth into five groups:
1. The Huguka Dukore program group
2. A cash grant group (intended to be the same cost as Huguka Dukore)
3. Cash grant and Huguka Dukore combined (to test if the interventions complement each other)
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4. A larger cash grant, which happened to be roughly equal to the cost of the combined arm
(about $845)
5. Control group, in which no program was offered at the time of study
Given that the total cost of the programs was not fully known before the study began, the
research team conducted a detailed costing exercise prior to, and also after, the intervention period.
The costing beforehand was used to estimate the total cost of the Huguka Dukore intervention, as
well as the estimated overhead costs to GiveDirectly of providing household grants in this context.
This exercise arrived at a per-beneficiary cost of $452.47 of the Huguka Dukore program. How-
ever, the program ended up costing substantially less: $388 per person, which once we accounted
for non-compliance is only $332 per study subject. Therefore researchers use regression adjustment
compared the program to a cash transfer costing the same amount, which would have delivered
$255.04 to beneficiaries (see section 2 for costing details).
The Huguka Dukore program was implemented for nine months, from January 2018 - November
2018 and the cash transfers were delivered between May 2018 - July 2018. The follow-up survey was
conducted 18 months after a baseline survey, from July 2019 August 2019, which was 18 months
after the baseline survey (8-9 months after the program ended). A longer-term follow-up survey
will be conducted 36 months after baseline (November 2020 February 2021).
Findings
Main Findings: Huguka Dukore compared to no intervention The main findings of evalu-
ation of the Huguka Dukore program, compared to the comparison group, are as follows:
• Youth experienced a surge in productive asset values, which rose to 154% higher than the
control group average, a large and notable impact given the program made no material
transfers to the beneficiaries.
• The program also led to an increase in productive hours: Huguka Dukore was successful in
driving a 3 hour increase to a base of 18.4 hours, an improvement of 16%.
• However, youth who received the program were no more likely to be employed than the
comparable youth who did not receive the program, nor did program youth experience higher
incomes or consumption as a result of the program.
• Average savings doubled.
• Subjective wellbeing improved (based on a survey about happiness and life-satisfaction)
• Business knowledge increased: participants performed better on a test of business knowledge
built against the course curriculum.
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Main Findings: Cash grants compared to no intervention The main findings of the evalua-
tion of the central cash grant amount (on average 14 months after transfers took place), compared
to the control group, are as follows:
• Youth in the cash group also experienced a surge in productive assets; values almost quadruple
relative to control.
• Youth experienced higher incomes and their household- and individual-level consumption
increased.
• Productive hours are non-linear in transfer amount, with the middle transfer amount leading
to a significant 6.5 hour per week increase, and none of the other transfers having a significant
impact. Youth in the large cash transfer arm achieve an insignificant 1.6-hour improvement.
This is the first evidence to suggesting that once transfers become sufficiently large they may
reduce the incentive to work.
• However, youth who received the program were no more likely to be employed than the
comparable youth.
• Average savings more than doubled
• Subjective well-being improved
• Net, non-land wealth increased by 90%
Main Findings: Huguka Dukore compared to cash grants In the head-to-head comparison,
the evaluation findings can be summarized as follows:
• The cost-equivalent cash grant performed significantly better than Huguka Dukore at increas-
ing monthly income, productive assets, subjective well-being, beneficiary consumption, and
household livestock wealth.
• Huguka Dukore was better at increasing business knowledge (the only outcome in which it
outperformed cash)
• In sum, over the 18 month horizon, youth benefited more from cash grants than from Huguka
Dukore program across a range of indicators central to beneficiary economic welfare, while
Huguka Dukore was more effective at generating business knowledge.
• Neither Huguka Dukore or cash grants had a statistically significant impact on employment
after 18 months.
Other noteworthy findings:
• The evaluation did not find any complementarity between HD and cash; when they are
implemented together we see the same or worse than we would expect by adding up the
independent effect of the two programs. Rather, in something of a challenge to ever-more
complex bundled programs, each of these interventions has a distinct set of benefits that
operated independently.
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• Nor did the evaluation find any spillover effects on outcomes of non-beneficiaries in the same
villages, though evidence suggests that take-up of HD is highest when that program is imple-
mented with high geographic intensity.
• Both interventions had a relatively consistent effect across richer and poorer, male and female,
older and younger, and across local labor market conditions.
• While neither program significantly improved overall employment rates during the study
period, a more detailed analysis shows that youth who received cash were more likely to move
from wage labor into self-employment (they became more entrepreneurial), while Huguka
Dukore beneficiaries became engaged in more off-farm wage labor (their training propelled
them into wage jobs). In other words, at cost-equivalent levels, cash and training have
launched youth into distinct forms of employment.
iv
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1 Introduction
The demographic dividend in Sub-Saharan Africa is a double-edged sword. A young population
provides an opportunity to benefit from the many productive years ahead while bearing a limited
burden of dependency from older generations—but not if young people are unable to find pro-
ductive employment (Fox et al., 2016). In spite of gains in formal educational attainment, youth
unemployment rates remain high; for example while 40 percent of Rwanda’s population is between
the ages of 14–30, 65 percent of these youth are unemployed. This raises the prospect of both a
lost generation of opportunity, and the political risks that accompany a large, unemployed, urban,
young population (Bongaarts, 2016). Hence, it is critical to understand the barriers in physical and
human capital that prevent youth from being fully productive.
In spite of this pressing need, policymakers have limited access to evidence-based interventions
with a track record of effectiveness. This is not to say that active labor-market interventions
have not been studied; for example, a recent review discusses nine randomized evaluations from
developing countries (McKenzie, 2017). Despite some signs of success in generating employment
(Alfonsi et al., 2019; Diaz and Rosas, 2016), the impacts of programs aimed at lifting human
capital have been variable and less impressive than hoped in terms of labor and income benefits.
A systematic review by Kluve et al. (2017) finds labor market interventions to have positive effects
on employment and income, but these impacts are small and highly variable across studies. At the
same time, the costs of relaxing capital constraints are falling due to the widespread availability of
mobile money in the developing world. A large literature finds that unconditional cash transfers
are invested in durables (Haushofer and Shapiro, 2016), productive assets (Blattman et al., 2018;
Gertler et al., 2012), and microenterprises (De Mel et al., 2012), suggesting that cash may be
a reasonable alternative in delivering economic livelihood assistance to youth. Given that the
literature has long recognized both ‘money and ideas’ may serve as constraints to the productivity
of young entrepreneurs (Gine´ and Mansuri, 2014), rigorous comparative cost-effectiveness research
across these different modalities is sorely needed, as well as a better understanding of potential
complementarities between them.
This study addresses these challenges by undertaking an exercise in cash benchmarking : the
direct comparison of in-kind- to cash-transfer programs in a single experimental setting. As an
applied-science exercise, such a study is a form of comparative cost-effectiveness analysis; it com-
pares the returns to alternative forms of programming on a pre-defined set of outcomes. And it
can answer this counterfactual question subject to a distributional constraint, seeking to hold the
value of programming per beneficiary constant across modalities.1 Such cash-benchmarking exer-
cises also inform a basic-science question, by lifting distinct constraints to individual employment
outcomes. Similar efforts include Ahmed et al. (2016) who compare BRAC’s ultra-poor program-
ming to cash, or Karlan et al. (2014) who examine the comparative impact of the relaxation of
credit and risk constraints in agriculture. In the context of youth livelihoods, training programs
1Our companion study McIntosh and Zeitlin (2019) uses a similar approach to benchmark a USAID-funded child
nutrition program against cash in Rwanda.
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and cash grants each move alternative potential constraints to productive employment—skills and
liquidity, respectively. One way of conceiving of the value of this benchmarking activity is that
for any given outcome, our design allows us to cast the opportunity cost of skills improvement in
pecuniary terms, despite the fact that these skills cannot be bought on the market. This allows
us not only to determine the benefit generated by an increment of skills improvement, but also to
calculate the counterfactual cost of generating the same benefit by relaxing financial (rather than
human capital) constraints. The inclusion of a combined arm allows us to study complementarities,
asking if the returns to relaxing capital constraints improve when human capital constraints have
also been relaxed.2
We study this question using an individually randomized trial with 1,848 underemployed Rwan-
dan youth to understand how a ‘standard’ package of training, soft skills, and networking interven-
tions compares not only to an experimental control group but to an additional arm that receives
household grants intended to be of equal cost to the donor—a cash benchmark. The study follows
poor, underemployed youth aged 15-30 who expressed interest in participating in the training pro-
gram. The core program is called Huguka Dukore/ Akazi Kanoze which means ‘Get Trained and
Let’s Work/Work Well Done’ in Kinyarwanda (abbreviated henceforth as HD); it follows USAID’s
strategy on workforce readiness and skills training and was implemented by Education Development
Center, Inc. (EDC). The benchmarking cash transfer program was implemented by GiveDirectly
(GD), a US-based nonprofit that specializes in making unconditional household grants via mobile
money. USAID also uses cash transfers in its programming in a number of dimensions, so this
study compares two different means through which it could attempt to deliver benefits.3 These
two treatments are compared to a control group, namely a set of individuals that receive neither
program, and a combined arm that receives both. Our study provides a methodology incorporating
randomization of transfer amounts and ex-post regression cost adjustment that can achieve this
benchmarking objective in a general way. In a penultimate ‘Value for Money’ section we show
how our study design can be used to conduct either cost equivalence comparisons, or to do cost
effectiveness analysis by comparing benefit-cost ratios across arms.
The Huguka Dukore program is a particularly attractive candidate for a benchmarking evalua-
tion. It is a five-year project (2017-2021) aiming to provide 40,000 vulnerable youth with employ-
ability skills in 19 (of 30 total) districts nationwide. Targeting youth from poor households with
less than secondary education, with an emphasis on women and youth with disabilities, HD offers
multiple program pathways including: i) employment preparation; ii) individual and cooperative
youth microenterprise start-up; iii) business development for existing microenterprises. HD is based
on a predecessor Akazi Kanoze program, which operated in the country from 2012-2017, and which
was evaluated as successful in an RCT led by EDC (Alcid, 2014). It is a carefully designed and
intensive training program, and it is backed by rigorous research heading in to this study.
2Fox and Kaul (2017) say that ”It may be helpful to experiment more with transferable skills development
initiatives. . . combined with cash transfers to youth or access to finance.”
3USAID currently uses cash mostly in the humanitarian space, but is also involved in new efforts to explore cash
as a form of development assistance in countries such as Morocco and Nigeria.
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The Government of Rwanda places a high priority on such programs: Priority Area 1 of the
“Economic Transformation Pillar” in its seven-year plan for the period 2017–2024 includes the key
strategic intervention to “support and empower youth and women to create businesses through
entrepreneurship and access to finance” (Republic of Rwanda, 2017, p. 3). Further, training
programs of this sort are widespread across the developing world: Blattman and Ralston (2015)
estimate that the World Bank alone spends almost a billion dollars annually on skills training
programs. In spite of their prevalence, however, the cost-effectiveness of such programs is far from
certain. Reviewing evidence on active labor market programs that operate on the supply side of
the labor market, McKenzie (2017) finds that employment and earnings impacts are modest, with
costs averaging 50 times the monthly income gain. And indeed, in its Future Drivers of Growth
report, produced jointly with the the World Bank, the Government of Rwanda raises the possibility
that “for a significant portion of the population who will continue creating their own jobs, capital-
centric programs may be more effective and cheaper to implement than simple training programs”
(Government of Rwanda and World Bank Group, 2019, p. 81). Our study seeks to resolve this
uncertainty by direct comparison.
The momentum for benchmarking has built as numerous studies have shown meaningful impacts
of cash transfers on important life outcomes in the short term, such as child nutrition (Aguero et
al., 2006; Seidenfeld et al., 2014), schooling (Skoufias et al., 2001), mental health (Baird et al., 2013;
Samuels and Stavropoulou, 2016), teen pregnancy and HIV (Baird et al., 2011), microenterprise
outcomes (De Mel et al., 2012), consumer durables (Haushofer and Shapiro, 2016), and productive
assets (Gertler et al., 2012). The evidence on the long-term impacts of cash transfers is more mixed
(Blattman et al., 2018), but some studies have found substantial impacts (Aizer et al., 2016; Balboni
et al., 2019; Barham et al., 2014; Fernald et al., 2009; Hoynes et al., 2016).4 The largest extant
literature on benchmarking is based on the comparison of cash aid to food aid (Ahmed et al., 2016;
Cunha et al., forthcoming; Hidrobo et al., 2014; Hoddinott et al., 2014; Leroy et al., 2010; Schwab
et al., 2013), which has uncovered a fairly consistent result that food aid leads to a larger change
in total calories while cash aid leads to an improvement in the diversity of foods consumed. Efforts
to benchmark more complex, multi-dimensional programs to cash include BRAC’s Targeting the
Ultra-Poor program (Chowdhury et al., 2016), microfranchising (Brudevold-Newman et al., 2017),
and graduation programs (Sedlmayr et al., 2017).
The randomized controlled trial proceeded in four steps. First, EDC’s three local implementing
partners within the study ran recruiting workshops drawing more than 2,000 eligible individu-
als who expressed interest in participating in HD. From this group we then conducted baselines,
checked eligibility, and recruited an experimental study sample of 1848 individuals who consented
to the lottery and the baseline survey and were included in the randomization. These individuals
come from 328 villages in non-urban parts of the three districts of Rwamagana, Muhanga and
4For examples of studies that find dissipating long-term benefits, see Baird et al. (2019), Araujo et al. (2017), and
Brudevold-Newman et al. (2017). Evidence from systematic reviews of cash transfers on schooling (Molina-Millan et
al., 2016) and child health (Manley et al., 2013; Pega et al., 2014) has also been uneven, with substantial heterogeneity
in findings across studies.
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Nyamagabe. The HD-imposed eligibility criteria for their training of vulnerable youth consist of
(a) ages ranging from 16–30, and (b) between 6-12 years of education. Because of the conditions
placed on GiveDirectly by the Rwandan government, we further strictly limited eligibility to (c)
households registered in Ubudehe poverty status 1 or 2 (the poorest). In addition, in order to
provide a study that has compliance rates with the HD training that are as high as possible, we
further restricted eligibility to those who (d) expressed interest in participating in the employment
and entrepreneurship readiness training. These individuals were recruited at a first ‘orientation’
meeting at which the local HD implementers and the survey firm (Innovations for Poverty Action,
or IPA) recorded sufficient information to enroll them and to subsequently perform baseline surveys
at the household (there were no refusals to the household survey). Second, IPA collected baseline
data, implementing survey instruments that collected information both at the household level and
at the individual beneficiary level for study participants. Third, IPA conducted a series of 13 public
lotteries at the sector level, overseen by sector- and local-level officials, at which individuals were
assigned to four main arms and a control, to be treated accordingly by implementers. Finally, the
study collects baseline and midline (18 month) indicators across a range of economic, psychological,
and business-related outcomes to measure comparative impacts.
We costed both programs in detail prior to, and after, the intervention period, following Levin
et al. (2017). The ex-ante costing exercise was used to identify the approximate total cost of the
HD intervention, as well as the estimated overhead costs to GiveDirectly of providing household
grants in this context. The ex-ante costing of HD arrived at a per-beneficiary cost of $464.25. We
then randomized transfer amounts at the individual level in the cash arm across four possible trans-
fer amounts. These amounts were chosen to provide informative benefit/cost comparisons across
two different margins: HD vs cash, and small versus large cash transfer amounts. Incorporating
GiveDirectly’s operating costs, the amount actually received by households that generates the same
expected cost to USAID as HD is $410.65. The comparison between these two arms therefore pro-
vides a straightforward window on expected cost-equivalent impacts. Because we anticipated that
the exact numbers from the ex-post costing exercise would differ from the ex-ante exercise, we
randomized two bracketing cash transfer arms which transfer $317 and $503 to households. Thus
even our smallest transfer is providing individuals with 167% of annual average per capita income.
In the end the HD program turned out to be less expensive than expected; the final ex-post costing
figure of $332.27 is used to regression-adjust outcomes across transfer amounts to arrive at a com-
parison between HD and cash estimated at the exact cost-equivalent amount from the perspective
of the donor, USAID. Because of the low costing number, an adjustment which was intended to be
an interpolation over GD transfer costs ends up being an extrapolation to a value 16% lower than
the smallest GD arm’s cost.
The study also features a combined arm that receives both the middle GD transfer amount and
HD training. The inclusion of this arm permits a classic test for complementarities between human
capital and financial interventions. Finally, the larger cash transfer arm was an amount chosen by
the cash implementer as maximizing their own cost-effectiveness (transferring $750, and costing
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$846.71 which turns out to be almost exactly the cost of the combined arm). The inclusion of this
arm provides a statistically high-powered way of examining how benefit/cost ratios shift as the
transfer amount rises. This opens up a different type of comparative cost effectiveness question:
would the net benefit from cash transfers be maximized by concentrating large payments on a
few individuals, or by spreading out smaller transfers to more people? And if more money is to
be invested over the basic transfer, should it be in the form of additional physical capital, or is
training then more effective?
Our results show that at 18 months after baseline, on average 15 months after being offered
HD programming and at least 3 months after any training would have ended, Huguka Dukore has
delivered real benefits. While there is no overall improvement in employment rates, the HD arm
sees an increase in productive hours, productive asset values more than double, average savings
increase by 60%, and subjective well-being is higher. In addition, the HD arm performs a half
a standard deviation better on a test of business knowledge built against the course curriculum,
showing that the program clears the basic bar of having created real learning.
The cash transfer arm, on average 14 months after transfers took place, sees improvements across
a broad range of economic and psychological outcomes. These impacts prove surprisingly invariant
to the transfer amount variation present in this study, suggesting that even our lower transfers clear
a barrier that generates real benefit to households. With the exception of the improvement that
HD generates on business knowledge, cash improves every outcome that HD improves, generally
with a greater magnitude, and in addition drives monthly income, household- and individual-level
consumption, livestock value, and overall wealth, to higher levels.
Consequently, when we conduct our pre-specified comparative impact analysis, we find cost-
equivalent cash to generate significantly larger benefits for income, productive and livestock assets,
individual consumption, and subjective well-being, while HD is more effective at generating the
human capital benefit of business knowledge. We find no evidence of complementarity between
human and physical capital interventions; if anything the combination appears to do worse than we
would expect by adding up the individual impact of the two programs. Significant negative com-
plementarities are present for productive hours of work and for subjective well-being. In summary,
then, at the cost of around $330 per beneficiary where the core comparison is done, cash moves
a set of economic and psychological outcomes more than HD, HD is better at improving business
knowledge, and both of the efforts we engaged in to increase the amount spent above this (whether
through more cash or through adding HD) had disappointing returns.
We then look for signs of heterogeneity in impacts across gender, as well as baseline consumption,
risk aversion, and local employment rates. Overall we see little meaningful heterogeneity, suggesting
that both interventions have a relatively consistent effect across richer and poorer, male and female,
and across local labor market conditions. We then exploit the random variation generated by the
lotteries in the intensity of treatment at the village level to look for evidence of spillovers.5 The
5This issue is particularly important given our household-level assignment and the recent evidence on spillovers
both from job training programs (Cre´pon et al., 2013) and cash transfer programs (Angelucci and De Giorgi, 2009;
Egger et al., 2019).
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only evidence we find for spillovers are that compliance with HD, which overall in the sample is
85%, is improved by having more people in your village assigned to HD as well. Looking at our
primary outcomes we find no evidence that spillovers from any treatment or to any treatment group
are present, suggesting that by this measure at least the study is internally valid.
These results illustrate the complexity of the comparisons created by this type of benchmarked
design. Considered relative to the control, HD has been successful in moving some of the key welfare
indicators the program is geared towards, and has strongly improved the core metric of learning.
Even in a comparative sense, it is impressive that a program that made no material transfer to
its beneficiaries could generate improvements in asset values half as large, and improvements in
savings two thirds as large, as a program that gave them hundreds of dollars. Nonetheless when
we compare the programs in a head-to-head way it becomes clear that at least at 18 months from
baseline, cash is outperforming the training program across a set of indicators likely to be central
to beneficiary economic welfare (individual consumption, income, livestock wealth, and subjective
well-being). In something of a challenge to ever-more complex bundled programs, we find that each
of these interventions has a distinct set of benefits that operate independently, and little is gained
by providing them together.
In the remainder of the paper, we provide details of the experimental design, survey structure,
and costing exercise in Section 2, and then present the results of the study in Section 3. Section 5
concludes.
2 Experimental Design
2.1 Interventions
Huguka Dukore: Employment and entrepreneurship readiness training
Huguka Dukore is a five-year activity providing 40,000 vulnerable youth with increased opportu-
nities for wage and self-employment through a suite of interventions that includes market relevant
work readiness training, employability skills training, work based learning, internship opportuni-
ties, links to employment and entrepreneurship training at the youth level. The program builds on
lessons learned from EDCs prior work in this area through the Akazi Kanoze Youth Livelihoods
Project (henceforth AK).
Over the life of the project, HD will prepare 21,000 new youth for employment with Rwandan
employers, with an additional 2,000 alumni receiving middle management training. It is assisting
13,000 new HD participants to start their own microenterprise, while supporting 4,000 youth (2,000
new and 2,000 AK alumni) with an existing microenterprise to grow their business, linking 15,000
youth to financial services. Finally, HD provides support to its 30 local Implementing Partners
(IPs) to improve their job placement rates. It is important to note that the full HD program in-
cludes a number of higher-level interventions, including training front-line providers, organizational
capacity building in workforce development systems, and facilitating linkages between businesses,
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government, and local NGOs. Because our intervention studies the cross-individual variation within
communities in which HD is working, we measure only the youth-level components of the interven-
tion and not these more systematic dimensions.
The HD program consists of a number of separate modules which are taken serially over the
course of a year. The first of these is ‘Work Ready Now!’, consisting of eight sub-modules (Personal
Development, Interpersonal Communication, Work Habits and Conduct, Leadership, Health and
Safety at Work, Worker and Employer Rights and Responsibilities, Financial Fitness, and Exploring
Entrepreneurship). This module is taken by all students as the lead-in to the HD training, and
consists of 10 five-day weeks of full-day training.
From here students choose the additional modules and the sector of work in which they receive
additional training, and the curriculum splits according to the nature of formal employment op-
portunities in local markets. In more urban areas students would then move on to a Technical and
Vocational Training (TVET) module, Transition to Work programming, and Work Based Learning
Services. Because our study areas are almost exclusively rural, HD instead encourages students
to focus on self-employment, meaning that the next module of HD would be the ‘Be Your Own
Boss’ training, which is an entrepreneurship curriculum that is tailored to the specific interests and
opportunities in a specific cohort of students, and lasts another 10 weeks. After this point HD
students are typically placed in an internship or apprenticeship position with a local entrepreneur
working in the selected sector. During this interval students have regular check-ins with their
trainers. Within a year of the initiation of training students are considered ‘graduates’ of HD.6
Because the curriculum involves several components of choice (whether to pursue vocational or
small business training, the sector in which to be trained), our experimental analysis will treat HD
as a single intervention of which this choice is an integral component. We provide an analysis of
the determinants of participation in various components of the potential HD curriculum.
GiveDirectly: Household grants program
To benchmark the impact of the HD program on cash, we worked with GiveDirectly, a US-based
501(c)3 Non-Profit organization. GiveDirectly specializes in sending mobile money transfers di-
rectly to the mobile phones of beneficiary households to provide large-scale household grants in de-
veloping countries including Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda. GiveDirectlys typical model has involved
targeting households using mass-scale proxy targeting criteria such as roof quality. GiveDirectly
builds an in-country infrastructure that allows them to enroll and make transfers to households
while simultaneously validating via calls from a phone bank that transfers have been received by
the correct people and in a timely manner. Their typical transfers are large and lump-sum, on
the order of $1,000, and the organization provides a programatically relevant counterfactual to
standard development aid programs, because it has a scalable business model that would in fact
6Additional components of the broader HD curriculum include assisting students with access to finance through
assistance in the formation of Savings and Internal Lending Communities and access to bank financing, and the use
of a job matching resource that maintains a list of open positions and attempts to match graduates to them. These
components of HD were not operative in the study districts at the time that we ran this evaluation.
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be capable of providing transfers to the tens of thousands of households that are served by the HD
program.
Since eligibility did not condition on having a cellphone, during the enrollment process indi-
viduals who did not themselves own a cell phone provided a number belonging to a trusted family
member or friend, and transfers were sent to them through this intermediary. The payments were
made to beneficiaries in two installments two months apart, with the first payment comprising 40
percent of the total to be paid to the beneficiary, and the second payment completing the transfer.
After each payment is made, staff in the GiveDirectly call center team in Kigali contact every
recipient to verify that payments have been received.
In terms of implementation timing, GD orientation commenced immediately after lotteries to
notify youth randomized to receive a household grant and introduce them to the program. The value
of household grants was not to be disclosed until the GD Treatment step below. GD Treatment
(where transfer values will be disclosed to recipients) did not commence anywhere until the lotteries
have been conducted everywhere in the district so as to avoid emphasizing the cash treatment prior
to the completion of recruitment.
The Combined Arm
The Combined arm received both treatments (GD Middle plus HD). Both interventions were re-
ceived at the same time as others in their same sector, meaning that they typically started the HD
treatment several months before they would receive the household grant from GD.
2.2 Enrollment criteria
A detailed timeline showing the evolution of the study is presented in Figure B.1. The study recruits
youth from 13 geographic ‘sectors’ in the districts of Rwamagana, Muhanga and Nyamagabe.7
Study participants had to be eligible for Huguka Dukore, to attend an informational session about
Huguka Dukore, to enroll in a lottery to determine participation in that program following that
informational setting, and to be traceable to a residence in a village in the sector where they were
recruited. Attendance in person at the public lottery was not required for program enrollment.
The study enrolled in its sample all individuals who met criteria for treatment by Huguka Dukore
in the study sectors. More detail on sample recruitment and the conduct of the lotteries is provided
in the Appendix.
Table A.1 shows the process by which we moved from the original oversubscription universe to
the final sample of 1848 individuals deemed as fully eligible who were recruited into the study and
randomized. Of 2,275 individuals who attended an orientation meeting and signed up for HD, 1,967
were found based on administrative review to meet the eligibility criteria. A further 119 could not
be located either in the village of their stated residence, or were found to be resident outside the
sector entirely, and consequently were deemed ineligible for intervention and the study.
7In Rwanda, the sector is the geo-political unit below the district. There are 30 districts in Rwanda, and 416
sectors in total across those 30 districts.
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There were no survey refusals at baseline, so our study sample reflects the full population of
individuals who were assigned to treatments. The final study sample therefore consists of the
universe of all individuals who met the enrollment criteria for Huguka Dukore, who attended an
information session; who agreed at that information session to be included in the assignment lottery;
who were found resident in the relevant sector at baseline.
Demographic and employment characteristics (the latter of which will be defined in greater
detail in Section 2.7 below) of the study participants are detailed in Table 2. Consistent with
Huguka Dukore’s ‘soft’ targeting criteria, the sample is 59 percent female, with an average age
of 23.5, (among the random sample assigned to control). They have an average of 7.6 years of
education, and typically live in households of approximately five individuals.
Although Huguka Dukore seeks to bolster employment opportunities for underemployed youth,
it does not employ a hard criterion regarding employment for eligibility. Consequently, it is not
unusual for individuals to report that they are employed: 33 percent of (control-group) respondents
reported being employed at baseline, using a definition that excludes agricultural work on a farm
belonging to their own household (see Section 2.7 for more details). By endline the employment
rate had risen to 48% in the control group.
Nonetheless, individuals in the study population are quite poor. 32 percent reside in households
that the Government of Rwanda categorizes as Ubudehe I—its lowest socio-economic category,
denoting a condition of ‘extreme poverty’. Median consumption per adult equivalent is 5,879 RWF
per month, which in 2018 PPP terms translates to a consumption level of USD 0.66 per day.
2.3 Assignment protocol
The allocation of these study households to treatment was undertaken on a randomized basis across
eligible, interested individuals using a public lottery. A public lottery was selected as the assignment
mechanism given the very large sums of money being transferred and the desire by all parties to
the research to ensure that the assignment was considered to be fair and impartial by the research
subjects.
Lotteries were conducted at the sector level in each of the 13 sectors in the study, and the
proportions assigned to each treatment were fixed at each lottery. This results in a fairly standard
‘blocked’ randomization structure across the 13 blocks in the study. Participants drew their own
treatment status as tokens of different colors from a sack, where each token corresponded to a
given treatment arm and the number of tokens in the hat was determined by IPA according to the
number of participants with fixed proportions assigned to each treatment.
The detailed protocol for the lottery is as follows:
1. Beneficiaries did not have to be physically present at the lottery to be included in the study.
2. We explicitly recognized the right of EDC/HD to eliminate from eligibility any individuals
who they feel, for whatever reason, was not serious about the program and that they did not
believe will fully enroll in HD if selected.
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3. Detailed information about GD was not provided prior to the lottery, but GD was described
in detail at the lottery and every effort was made to preserve the separate identity of HD and
GD so as not to provoke confusion about the broader HD program. All information provided
at the lottery was given to everyone, and there was not an attempt to separate groups and
give private information.
4. A representative of both GD and HD (or its local partner) were present at every lottery.
5. Individuals were notified whether they have been assigned to the GD, the combined arm or
the HD arm at the time of the lottery.
6. Individuals assigned to GD received a variety of colors which correspond to different transfer
amounts. This means that the random assignment to GiveDirectly simultaneously randomly
assigned individuals to the different transfer size amounts. The exact financial amounts were
not discussed at the time of the lotteries. GD explained that youth randomized to GD would
be contacted soon after the lottery to orient them to the program, and visited at their place
of residence to undertake the enrollment process.
Table 1 shows the outcome of the lottery process, giving the number of individuals assigned to
each of the treatment arms within each lottery, as well as overall.
The assignment of individuals to the main study arms was as follows:
1. HD beneficiaries (485 individuals);
2. Recipients of unconditional household grants (672 individuals);
3. Combined arm who received both HD and the household grants intervention (203 individuals)
4. A comparison group, in which no program was offered (488 individuals).
Household grants were randomized at the individual level over four transfer amounts. The
value of the first transfer amount was made equivalent to the total cost of providing HD to each
beneficiary, which is $452.47. Less GD’s own associated costs of delivery, this means that an
amount of $410.19 was actually transferred to households in this arm to make them cost-equivalent
to USAID. Because we did not know the true per-capita cost of HD with certainty beforehand,
we randomize GD transfer amounts to two additional values that bracket this expected cost. The
bracketing amounts are derived by supposing that the number of beneficiaries for the year two
tranche of HD funding nationwide might vary between 8,000 and 12,000 beneficiaries, meaning
that the per-capita cost would vary between $377.05 and $565.58. Again netting out GD’s costs of
making transfers, that means that households in these arms actually receive $317.34 and $503.04,
respectively (note that because we costed each GD transfer amount separately and because many
of GD’s costs are fixed at the individual level, the fraction of total cost that is operating cost
declines as the transfer amount increases). The fourth transfer amount was designed to maximize
the benefit-cost ratio of household grants, and transferred $750 to beneficiaries.
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Table 1: Study Design
GiveDirectly Combined
Sector Control
Huguka
Dukore
317.16 410.65 502.96 750.30 HD + 410.65
Kaduha 63 60 21 21 22 22 26
Kibumbwe 32 37 10 10 12 13 13
Kigabiro 14 12 4 5 4 5 5
Kiyumba 17 17 6 6 6 6 8
Mugano 51 51 18 18 18 18 22
Muhazi 39 40 13 19 13 18 17
Munyaga 34 34 10 10 10 12 14
Munyiginya 25 25 8 8 8 10 10
Musange 30 29 10 10 10 9 12
Mushishiro 24 23 6 6 6 9 8
Nyakariro 49 50 16 17 19 17 22
Nyarusange 57 54 21 20 19 19 24
Shyogwe 53 53 18 18 18 20 22
Total 488 485 161 168 165 178 203
Note : This table gives the number of study individuals assigned to each treatment arm in each of the 13 sectors within which lotteries were conducted. The
lotteries were blocked so that fixed fractions of individuals are assigned to each arm.
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In the first phase of lotteries, comprising 792 study participants—we randomized purely at the
individual level, as the study design did not anticipate multiple enrollees from the same household.
In fact, the 792 participants in the first tranche of lotteries comprised 732 unique households.
This resulted 34 households in which individuals in the same household were assigned to different
treatments (at the level of the major arms of the study). Having recognized this issue, we altered
the protocol in the second phase of lotteries and assigned treatment at the household level. To
reflect this issue we cluster standard errors at the household level.
Given the public nature of the lottery assignment, the study was not blinded either to partici-
pants or to the survey firm. The study is not a pipeline design, and to avoid expectancy biases we
made it clear to the subjects at the time of the lottery that there would be no subsequent treatment
by these implementers in the area.
2.4 Program Participation
Compliance with GiveDirectly treatment was nearly perfect. One individual in the middle GD arm
was found to be ineligible by Ubudehe status and was not treated, and one individual assigned
to the lower GD arm actually received the upper GD treatment. For GD the ITT is therefore
effectively the average treatment effect.
As anticipated, HD was most successful in achieving participation in its initial 10-week training
(Work Ready Now). 86% of the full HD treatment group (both HD-only and combined arms) were
counted as enrolled according to the contractual definition (attending the end of the first week of
WRN training). This is the rate that the costing exercise uses since it alone determines the amount
paid from USAID to the local implementing partner. But we can use institutional data from the
HD program to examine participation in more detail.
Retention during the course of WRN is high; 79% of the overall sample completes this 10-
week training program, which focuses on general workforce readiness.8 69% of the of the HD
sample complete the Build Your Own Business class (which is focused on entrepreneurship and self-
employment); 13 individuals who did not take WRN did then go on to enroll in BYOB. Finally, the
technical training component of the HD intervention provides focused vocational instruction in a
specific sector. 48% completed the Technical Training component of the program. In the combined
arm, participation with each of these components is about 5 pp higher than in the HD-only arm.
Again, participation in Technical Training is not strictly confined to individuals who participated
in any of the previous combinations of treatments.9
To understand the factors that determine selection into the various components of HD, we
regress participation in each component of the program on a battery of baseline characteristics,
pooling the entire HD treatment group (HD only and combined). The results are presented Table
8The modules of the WRN curriculum are: personal development, interpersonal communication, work habits and
conduct, leadership, health and safety at work, worker rights, financial fitness, and exploring entrepreneurship.
9The formality of the sectors towards which the technical training is geared varies, ranging from formalized
(hospitality) to quasi-formal (tailoring, hairdressing) to more agricultural forms of self-employment (poultry, pig
rearing). Tailoring and poultry make up almost 75% of the trainings.
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A.3. In general compliance is relatively similar across observed beneficiary characteristics; older
individuals are slightly more likely to complete the entrepreneurship training but not technical
training. There is a modest, negative association between working more at baseline and the likeli-
hood of completing each stage of training; each additional hour of productive time use at baseline
is associated with a reduction of approximately 0.4 percentage points in completion at all stages.
Conversely, higher debt stocks at baseline are associated with greater completion rates. Both of
these effects appear to be primarily driven by initial compliance, with measured attributes having
little ability to predict subsequent compositional changes.
2.5 Survey data collection and processing
2.5.1 Instruments
Because we were interested in understanding both individual-level and household-level impacts,
we used two distinct instruments within each round of data collection. A household survey was
administered to the household head, and a beneficiary survey was administered to the beneficiary.
For beneficiaries who lived on their own or who headed their own household, these instruments
coincided.
We provide an overview of the contents of each instrument in Table A.2. Construction of
primary outcomes and hypothesized effect moderators are detailed in Section 2.7 below.
In addition to this midline, we also intend to return to the field 36 months after baseline to
conduct a longer-term follow-up survey, providing an eventual window into longer-term impacts.
Data collected then will be used to revisit the longer-term evolution of these interventions on the
lives of the beneficiaries.
2.6 Attrition
We attempted to follow up with all study beneficiaries 18 months after baseline. The tracking
protocol for the post-treatment round was designed around the individual beneficiary, following
him or her to whatever the relevant household was at that time (rather than tracking the baseline
household). The interventions studied in this trial have the possibility of inducing migration;
consequently it was particularly important to have a strategy to address attrition. Our tracking
strategy proceeded in two phases. First, we attempted to track all individuals who were still residing
in any study district or in Kigali. Once we had completed this exercise we were left with 122 baseline
individuals who we had not yet found. We then randomly sampled half of these individuals (blocking
on treatment status), and began an ‘intensive tracking’ phase that spent substantial resources to
track them wherever they had gone, including migrating out of the country, and survey them. This
exercise resulted in IPA finding and surveying all 60 living beneficiaries in the intensive tracking
sample (one had passed away). Given this remarkable rate of contact, we have an unusual situation
where we should be able to convincingly correct for attrition by simply giving the intensive tracking
sample weights of 2.
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To verify that the data weighted in this way recovers the missing potential outcomes, we should
establish whether the intensive sample that we drew was representative of the universe of early
attritors. We can analyze this by a balance test of the intensive tracking sampling across the
baseline outcome for all the early attritors. The sample for this is small (122) but in Table A.4 we
find no evidence of systematic problems with this sampling (2 outcomes out of 20 unbalanced with p-
values below 0.10 prior to correction for the False Discovery Rate or FDR, and none significant once
we have corrected). These two pieces of evidence—representative sampling in intensive tracking and
near-perfect tracking rate—suggest that we have an endline sample that is uniquely representative
of the randomized universe.
2.7 Balance
The next step is then to establish whether the attrited and reweighted sample used for analysis was
balanced at baseline. To ask this question, we estimate a balance table using baseline outcomes
but only for the attrited endline sample, and with the weights, blocking, and clustering used in the
endline analysis. This makes the balance test mimic the impact analysis we will run as closely as
possible; these results are presented in Table 2. The experiment appears well balanced (note that
this is also the case if we simply use the full unweighted baseline sample), with rates of rejection
consistent with random noise and none of the joint F-tests of all treatments indicating imbalance.
We therefore proceed to the analysis of impacts with confidence that the study is internally valid.
2.8 Cost Equivalence, Before and After the Fact
2.8.1 Costing at Scale
The costing exercise in the study utilized the ‘ingredients method’ (for more discussion, see Dhaliwal
and Tulloch, 2012; Levin and McEwan, 2001; Levin et al., 2017; Walls et al., 2019). The policy
question is asked from the perspective of the donor (in this case, USAID): the policy objective is
to achieve the highest benefit-cost ratio per intended beneficiary for each dollar that is spent on a
program. Operating expenditures in the implementation chain are an inherent part of these costs,
and so the lower transactions costs in getting mobile money to the beneficiary play an important
role in their potential attractiveness. We conducted two different costing exercises at two moments
in time. The ex-ante exercise, which was based on projected budgets and staffing costs, was used
to predict the cost at the time of the study design, and to choose the ranges over which the lower
GiveDirectly transfer amounts would be randomized. Then, a rigorous ex-post costing exercise was
conducted for both programs after the fact, using actual budgets and expenditures.
Since the HD program is eventually to cover twenty-three districts (e.g. much larger than the
study population only) we attempt to cost the full national program (not just the study sample),
inclusive of all direct costs, all indirect in-country management costs including transport, real
estate, utilities, and the staffing required to manage the program, and all international operating
costs entailed in managing the HD program. Because we do not want differences in scale to drive
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics and balance
GiveDirectly Control
HD Lower Middle Upper Large Combined Mean Obs. R2 p-value
Ubudehe category I 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.01 −0.03 0.32 1720 0.07 0.73
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
Beneficiary female 0.01 −0.02 0.03 −0.02 0.02 −0.05 0.60 1770 0.04 0.68
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
Beneficiary age −0.21 −0.41 −0.12 −0.66 0.43 −0.33 23.58 1770 0.03 0.12
(0.23) (0.31) (0.34) (0.32) (0.32) (0.31)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
Beneficiary years of
education
0.11 0.10 −0.03 0.07 0.03 −0.14 7.55 1770 0.07 0.91
(0.15) (0.22) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.19)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
Household members −0.32 −0.36 −0.03 0.00 −0.07 −0.32 4.98 1766 0.03 0.26
(0.16) (0.24) (0.33) (0.20) (0.22) (0.19)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
Employed 0.04 −0.00 −0.03 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.33 1770 0.02 0.73
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
Productive hours 0.45 −1.17 0.19 2.17 0.44 −0.13 10.81 1770 0.02 0.88
(1.28) (1.68) (1.82) (2.04) (1.65) (1.54)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
Monthly income 0.07 −0.03 −0.24 0.08 0.11 0.18 4.37 1770 0.01 0.99
(0.33) (0.47) (0.46) (0.46) (0.47) (0.42)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
Productive assets −0.56 −0.47 −0.10 −0.30 −0.43 −0.13 2.49 1770 0.03 0.56
(0.28) (0.38) (0.39) (0.40) (0.40) (0.38)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
HH consumption per
capita
−0.12 −0.11 −0.08 −0.10 −0.19 −0.01 9.46 1766 0.05 0.37
(0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
Beneficiary-specific
consumption
−0.07 0.07 −0.03 −0.17 0.11 0.01 7.53 1770 0.03 0.93
(0.15) (0.19) (0.21) (0.22) (0.18) (0.20)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
HH net non-land wealth −0.05 0.35 0.15 −0.17 1.13 −0.22 10.53 1766 0.03 0.19
(0.46) (0.54) (0.63) (0.70) (0.47) (0.60)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
Savings −0.26 −0.48 −0.34 0.03 −0.09 0.13 8.01 1770 0.04 0.82
(0.30) (0.41) (0.44) (0.39) (0.39) (0.38)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
Debt 0.12 −0.14 −0.30 0.03 0.15 0.75 7.84 1770 0.02 0.47
(0.32) (0.45) (0.46) (0.44) (0.45) (0.40)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
HH livestock wealth 0.29 −0.18 0.20 0.24 −0.26 −0.17 7.32 1766 0.03 0.93
(0.40) (0.57) (0.58) (0.55) (0.56) (0.52)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
Business Knowledge −0.01 0.10 −0.01 −0.08 −0.03 0.09 0.00 1770 0.03 0.57
(0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
Notes: Table presents control means and standard deviations; regression coefficients and standard errors for associated comparisons,
and p-value for a test of the hypothesis that all arms pool. Regression-based comparisons and associated hypothesis tests based
on a regression with block indicators. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
All continuous variables winsorized at top and bottom 1 percent. Inverse hyperbolic sine transformation taken for monthly income,
household consumption, beneficiary expenditure, savings, debt, and wealth variables.
differential costs per beneficiary, we asked GiveDirectly to artificially scale up their operations and
provide us with numbers reflecting the costs per beneficiary if they were running a national-scale
program across eight districts, including 40,000 beneficiary households like HD. This is the relevant
scale for a USAID program officer contemplating commissioning a program to move the outcomes
studied. Beneficiary identification costs, incurred partly by the survey firm and partly by HD, are
calculated on a per-head basis and added to the costs of both implementers equally.10
We costed each GD arm separately, asking what the operating costs would have been if GD had
run a national program at the scale of HD giving only transfers of that amount. Operating costs
as a percentage of the amount transferred decline with transfer amount for GD because fixed costs
represent a large share of their total costs. This allows us to conduct the benefit/cost comparisons
at scale, rather than having the artificial, multi-amount environment of the study contaminate the
costing exercise across arms.
2.8.2 Differential Compliance
Given that the Intention-to-Treat is the heart of the experimental analysis, we construct the ‘cost
per study subject’ that corresponds to the spend on the sample over which the ITT is estimated.
The raw costing returns the cost per beneficiary, but less than this is spent per study subject to
deliver the ITT if compliance is less than 1. Both implementers face a relatively simple relationship
between cost and compliance. For GD, individuals not treated cost nothing. Similarly for HD, their
rules stipulate that they pay sub-IPs a fixed amount based on enrollment at the end of the first of
WRN training to then follow through and offer all appropriate subsequent classes in the curriculum.
These costs are almost exclusively based on offering the courses and do not scale sharply with class
size. Hence, we consider all costs as ‘averted’ for non-compliers, and for each arm we calculate the
ITT-comparable cost by multiplying the compliance rate times the cost per beneficiary.
2.8.3 Final Costing Numbers
Table 3 shows the evolution of the costing analysis. As described above, the ex-ante costing exercise
arrived at a figure of $464.25 per HD beneficiary, with bracketing costs of $377.03 and $571.74. GD
took this number and applied their cost structure to it for a program scaled to 40,000 beneficiaries,
and arrived at an ex-ante cost-equivalent transfer of $410.65 to be actually delivered to beneficiaries.
The bracketing cash arms received $317 and the upper arm $503, and the ‘huge’ arm received $750,
the amount that GD believed would maximize benefit-cost.
Then, based on the ex-post costing exercise, we recalculate USAID costs applying the more
accurate costing figures to the sums actually transferred. These figures show that HD was less
expensive than anticipated, and GD operating costs were slightly higher than anticipated. This
means that the effect USAID spend per beneficiary was only $388.32, while the spending for the
GD middle arm was $493.96. The inclusion of non-compliance further widens this gap, meaning
10This means that the operating costs for both implementers are slightly higher than they would have been absent
the study-driven beneficiary identification costs, but these expenses drop out of the comparative costing analysis.
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that the USAID spend per study household in the HD arm was $332.27, while in the GD arms
it was $394.93, $490.99, $590.41, and $846.71, respectively. The combined arm, incorporating
compliance with both components of the combined treatment, ended up costing USAID $840.20
per study individual, an amount similar to the GD large arm. These are the numbers used in the
Cost Equivalent table. In sum, our study ends up with even the smallest of the GD cost-equivalent
arms transferring somewhat too much to be directly comparable to HD, but the GD Large arm
providing a very close cost counterfactual to the Combined arm.11 It is important to remember in
looking at our results, then that the GD arms cost more than HD, and only through the linearity
assumption in our cost-equivalence comparison can we recover the exact benchmarking amount. An
implication for future work is that using wider brackets may be reasonable given the considerable
uncertainty we have uncovered moving from ex-ante to ex-post cost estimates.
11The lower final costs arise primarily from two factors. First, compliance was lower than expected given that we
were working with a group who had expressed willingness to participate in HD. Second, the ex post costing revealed
a larger than expected share of costs in the early years of the HD budget being spent on curriculum development
and implementer training. Because these costs are amortized over beneficiaries for the full five years of the program,
they pushed down the spend per beneficiary in this early year of the study.
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Table 3: Results of Costing Exercise
Treatment Arm: Ex Ante Cost Value received Ex Post Cost Fraction operating cost Compliance Rate Cost per study household
Huguka Dukore $464.25 $153.47 $388.32 60.5% 85.6% $332.27
GD lower $377.03 $317.16 $394.39 19.6% 100% $394.39
GD mid $464.25 $410.65 $493.96 16.9% 99.4% $490.99
GD upper $571.74 $502.96 $590.41 14.8% 100% $590.41
GD large $828.47 $750.3 $846.71 11.3% 100% $846.71
Combined $928.5 $561.11 $885.64 36.3% 89.6%(HD), 100%(GD) $840.20
Note: The first column shows the ex-ante costing data on which study was designed; the core number is the HD cost around which the GD actual transfer
amounts in column 2 were designed. Column 3 shows the results of the ex post costing exercise. Column 4 provides the share of spending that did not reach the
beneficiaries either in cash or in direct training and materials costs. Column 5 shows the compliance rates, and since all costs are averted for non-compliers then
the final column shows the final cost per study subject for each arm that are the basis of the cost-equivalent comparisons.
18
3 Results
3.1 Overall ITT Impacts
The data from the study are analyzed consistent with the design being a multi-arm, household-
randomized program. Let the subscript i indicate the individual, h the household, and b the
randomization block (lottery groups within which the randomization was conducted). For outcomes
observed both at baseline (Yihb0) and at endline (Yihb1), we conduct ANCOVA analysis including the
baseline outcome, fixed effects for the sector-level assignment blocks within which the randomization
was conducted µb, as well as a set of baseline control variables selected from the baseline data on
the basis of their ability to predict the primary outcomes, denoted by Xihb0. Base regressions
to estimate the Intention to Treat Effect include indicators for the HD treatment THDihb , a vector
of indicators for each of the three GD ‘small’ treatment values, TGDS1ihb , T
GDS2
ihb , and T
GDS3
ihb , an
indicator for the GD ‘large’ treatment TGDLihb , and an indicator for the combined arm T
COMB
ihb :
Yihb1 = δ
HDTHDihb + δ
GDS1TGDS1ihb + δ
GDS2TGDS2ihb + δ
GDS3TGDS3ihb
+δGDLTGDLihb + δ
COMBTCOMBihb + βXihb0 + ρYihb0 + µb + ihb1 (1)
Block-level fixed effects,µb, are included to account for the block randomization of the study. Stan-
dard errors will be clustered at the household level because the second tranche of treatment was
assigned at the household level. Following the ‘post-double-LASSO’ procedure of Belloni et al.
(2014b), a set of covariates were selected using a LASSO algorithm on the control data; further
details of this procedure are provided in Appendix C. For outcomes that are collected at endline
only, we cannot include the lagged outcome to run the ANCOVA regression, and so use the simple
cross-sectional analog to Equation (1).
To mitigate risks of false discovery across multiple outcomes and treatments, we report Ander-
son’s 2008 False Discovery Rate to adjust p-values within each of the four relevant families (primary
outcomes and the three families of secondary outcomes outlined in Section D.2.2), ensuring that
the false discovery rate at the family level is controlled at five percent. This follows the procedures
described in our Pre-Analaysis Plan (PAP).
Tables 4 and 5 present the results of this analysis, with the five primary outcomes in the rows
of the table, and in the columns we include the core treatment arms of the study: HD, each of the
three smaller GD arms that were designed to be cost equivalent, the large cash transfer arm (GD
Large), and the arm that receives both the medium GD cash transfer amount and HD (Combined).
Appendix Tables A.5 and A.6 present the more parsimonious specification that pools the three
smaller GD transfer amounts into one arm.
Because each treatment is measured with a dummy variable the outcomes here should be inter-
preted as differences relative to the control group which received no intervention. For each point
estimate we present both the unadjusted standard error (in soft brackets) as well as the False
Discovery Rate adjusted q-value [in hard brackets]. The stars on the coefficients are based on
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the adjusted q-values, with one, two, and three stars indicating significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%
respectively.
Beginning with Table 4, we see that none of the programs were successful in driving the core
outcome of employment rates. Relative to a control group employment rate of 48%, neither HD,
cash, nor the combination saw improvements of more than 5 percentage points. Given that the
minimum detectable effect of our study (which can be calculated by multiplying the standard error
times 1.96) was between 6 and 10 pp, these modest improvements are not close to being significant.
Moving to the continuous measure of the number of productive hours worked in a week, we see
more promising impacts. Here, HD was successful in driving a 3 hour increase off a base of 18.4,
an improvement of 16%. Over the 18 months since baseline the trend in the control group shows
substantial increases in employment rates (from 33 to 48%) and productive hours (from 11 to 19
hours per week), and treatment effects relative to this large secular improvement are modest.12
The GD transfers appear to have had a non-linear effect on productive time use; the middle
transfer has a strong effect (an increase of 6.5 hours per week) but both smaller and larger transfers
are insignificant. As the transfer amount increases the productive labor increase disappears, with
the Large arm achieving an insignificant 1.1 hour improvement. This is the first evidence of an
apparent non-monotonicity in the impact of cash, suggesting that moderate transfers induce a
complementary increase in labor inputs, but once transfers become sufficiently large they begin
to shift the opportunity cost of leisure, discouraging labor inputs. The Combined arm, far from
showing signs of a complementarity between the two programs, suggests that when individuals
receive both cash and training there is no corresponding improvement in labor inputs, while had
they received either alone this benefit would have been observed. In the following subsection we
provide a more detailed analysis of the employment impacts of the different programs.
Next we consider the primary household outcomes of monthly income, productive assets, and
consumption per capita. All of these outcomes are measured as the inverse hyperbolic sine, meaning
that impacts can be interpreted as percent changes (like a log, but capable of handling zeroes).13
Beginning with the impact of HD, we see a 31% increase in income (not significant), no meaningful
change in consumption, but an impressive and highly significant surge in productive assets; these
rise to be 151% higher than the control group mean. For a program that has made no material
transfers to the beneficiaries, this improvement is substantial and impressive. When we look at the
impact of cash transfers, we replicate the results of many other studies, showing that cash can lead
to substantial improvements in these indicators. Measuring outcomes roughly 14 months after the
transfers were made, we find the GD treatments leading to a doubling of monthly income, again
non-monotonic with intermediate transfers appearing to be most effective. There is a quadrupling
of productive asset values, and household consumption increases by 20-36 percent. For the Large
12This pattern is suggestive of the ‘Ashenfelter’s dip’ the literature has long understood to exist in the evaluation
of job training programs, given that those interested in entering them have systematically experienced negative wage
outcomes (Ashenfelter and Card, 1985). This makes RCTs of such programs particularly valuable.
13Note that none of the recall windows include the period in which the transfers were received, and so our income
measures are not mechanically picking up the receipt of the transfers themselves.
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arm (whose value received is 80% larger than the GD Middle arm) we see outcomes that are in
general very similar to the smaller arms; slightly smaller impacts on income, essentially identical
impacts on productive asset values, and slightly larger effects on consumption. So again, these
results are consistent with the idea that the Large arm induces a smaller productive effect than
the Main arm leading to less earned income (see penultimate column of Table 4 for significance
tests). Given this, the superior consumption for the Large arm appears to be being permitted by
the spending down of transferred resources. In all cases the Combined arm has impacts that look
relatively similar to the Middle arm (despite having spent almost twice as much), suggesting a lack
of complementarity.
For the GD arms where compliance is 100%, the intention to treat measures effect of actually
receiving the program, namely, the treatment on the treated (ToT). For the HD arm where the
loosest measure of compliance is 85.6%, if we are willing to assume that those not participating
received no indirect effect of being included in the treatment, then we can back out the ToT by
dividing by the compliance rate. The resulting ToT estimate would 17% larger than the ITT for
each variable, with the same significance level.
Moving then to the secondary outcomes of the study, in Table 5 we present three families of
outcomes: beneficiary welfare, household wealth, and cognitive and non-cognitive skill development.
Beginning with beneficiary welfare, we have two ways of measuring mental health. The first of these
is a composite of the answers to two simple Likert-scaled questions about subjective well-being, one
on happiness and one on life satisfaction. For this outcome, we see every arm improving subjective
well-being, with effects for any arm receiving cash that are more than twice as large as the HD arm.
Our second measure of mental health is built around reporting on a set of potential mental health
issues over the past two weeks, including stress, ability to concentrate, losing sleep, confidence, and
feelings of worthlessness. Interestingly, none of the interventions improve this measure, suggesting
that we are seeing improvements in general life satisfaction but no decrease in specific negative
symptoms of poor mental health. Our final measure of beneficiary welfare is the inverse hyperbolic
sine of the consumption of the specific beneficiary (as opposed to the primary outcome of household
consumption). Here we see no improvements under HD, and increases of approximately 50% over
the control outcome for any arm that receives cash (again larger for the middle-sized transfers).
Next we examine measures of household wealth. Perhaps unsurprisingly, cash transfers move
these outcomes powerfully. Once again we see an impact that appears to be relatively homogeneous
and somewhat non-monotonic in all arms that receive cash transfers, with net non-land wealth more
than doubling in all arms but the smallest, livestock wealth tripling, and savings doubling. In Figure
B.2 we plot the Cumulative Density Functions of savings across the different treatments. All the
treatment distributions first-order dominate the control, implying treatment effects for savers of all
levels. While coefficients on debt are negative for all cash arms, there is no evidence of significant
pay-down of debt arising from cash transfers over this time. HD exhibits interesting impacts, with
no change in the core measures of household wealth, but an increase both in savings (103% increase,
significant at the 1% level) and debt (41% increase, insignificant).
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Finally, we examine cognitive and non-cognitive skills. Using the standard Locus of Control
index we find our first evidence of complementarities, in that only the Combined arm moves this
outcome. None of the arms influence measures of Aspirations or the Big 5 index.14 Our measure
of business knowledge is a score on a set of questions built to reflect the HD curriculum, and hence
serves as a manipulation check on their beneficiaries having learned what was intended. The results
show that any arm who received HD (HD or Combined) has about a half of a standard deviation
improvement in their performance on this test, a very sizeable effect. GD does not move this score
at all. The business attitudes measure we use captures attitudes toward entrepreneurship; while
none of the interventions significantly improve it they all lead to an increase of about 0.1 SD, and
prior to the correction for false discovery the smaller GD arms (which saw a surge in productive
hours) had an effect on this measure significant at the 10% level. The improvement in business
knowledge for HD participants does not translate into an increase in entrepreneurship.
In Tables A.5 and A.6 we present a more parsimonious specification that pools the three smaller
GD arms into one; this analysis was pre-specified due to a concern about a potential lack of power
when the smaller GD arms are analyzed separately. In the event we have many significant results
for the disaggregated analysis, indicating that power is not a concern, and so the specification
pooling these arms simply provides an overview of the average effects across these smaller arms.
3.1.1 Detailed Analysis of Employment Effects
Given the central importance of employment in this study, we now seek to dig deeper into the
differential impact of the programs. More nuance can be provided for these results in a number
of dimensions. First, we can examine how the treatments shift the full distribution of time use by
plotting the densities of productive time use across arms. Figure B.3 shows a modest rightward
shift in the CDFs (implying an increase in hours worked) across most of the distribution. None of
the interventions moved hours for those who would have worked least, the Combined arm is most
effective around the middle of the distribution, and the HD Main arm is most effective for those
working the most hours. This speaks to the enabling effect of additional capital being particularly
important for those already heavily engaged in productive work.
In Appendix Table A.7 we present a more detailed analysis using the five disaggregated cat-
egories in which we asked the underlying time use questions. These report the hours beneficia-
ries worked in the previous week in agricultural wage labor, non-agricultural wage labor, non-
agricultural enterprises, agricultural self-employment, or agricultural processing and trading. In-
terestingly, the HD treatment induces an increase in non-agricultural wage labor of an estimated
6 percentage points (against a control-arm counterfactual of 30 percent), as well as a modest in-
crease in agriculture-related self-employment, while the impacts of cash transfers are concentrated
14The original aspirations survey which we borrowed from Bernard et al. (2014) used the gap between desired
future income/wealth standing and the current standing to measure aspiration; we found that our interventions had
substantial positive impacts on the current economic standing at the time of the survey and little effect on desired
future standing. This showed up as a negative treatment impact on aspirations; we therefore have deviated from our
PAP and present the aspirations results using only the desired future economic standing.
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in non-agricultural enterprise and self-employment labor, at the expense of agricultural (and, at
high transfer values, other forms of) wage labor.
Next, we delve into the source of the dissonance between our binary measure of employment,
which shows no impact, and the continuous measure of productive hours, which does. The obvious
suspect here is the specific threshold used to define ‘employed’. To examine this, we vary this
threshold continuously from 5 hours per week to 40 hours per week, and present a visualization of
employment rates across thresholds and across treatment arms. We use the disaggregated labor
categories analyzed in Table A.7, which are presented in the Appendix in decreasing order of
their importance to total employment. First, Figure B.4 presents effects on non-agricultural wage
labor (the category with the most overall time use). In general, the treatments effects represent
similar vertical shifts across all the employment thresholds, implying that the binary estimate
of employment effects would not be sensitive to threshold. HD exerts a positive effect, and GD
Large a negative effect, on wage employment. Non-agricultural self employment, as shown in
Figure B.5, responds little to HD, and to cash amounts in a relatively monotonic way (bigger
transfers mean bigger impacts). Agricultural wage employment, which is both arduous and low-
paid, appears to demonstrate an income effect in being depressed by any kind of cash transfer
(Figure B.6).15 Agricultural self-employment is increased by all the treatments, and it is here that
the non-monotonicity in transfer amounts is strongest, with GD Main seeing a larger effect than
GD Large (Figure B.7). Finally, agricultural processing and trading appears to be a sector that HD
encourages individuals to leave, helping to explain smaller total productive hours effects despite the
surge seen in non-ag wage employment and agricultural self-employment (Figure B.8). Given the
general invariance of the impacts to the thresholds used, this suggests that the dissonance arises
from the fact that the treatment effects on productive hours are occurring among those who would
anyways have been counted as employed.
Finally, we can exploit a different source of data, which is a series of phone calls made by IPA
to all of the study participants over the period from November 2017 (around the end of the HD
intervention) to May 2019 (a few months before the midline). The core purpose of these phone
calls was to acquire tracking information for the in-person survey, but we block randomized the
month in which we called each individual, and during the call asked the same time use questions
that would be included in the midline. This survey was successful in reaching 1,797 of our study
subjects (97%), and given the randomization by month provides a clean way of estimating the time
path of treatment effects. In Figure B.9 we show coefficient plots of ITT regressions run separately
within each month’s sample of surveys. The HD Main treatment has a consistent positive effect
on time use across every monthly sub-sample, while the coefficients on the other treatments are
more unstable across time. A core purpose of this phone survey was to see what happened to
15Using our own data to divide the amount earned by the hours worked for each of the five labor sectors, we find
agricultural wage labor having by far the lowest pay, 10 cents per hour. The pay in non-agricultural wage labor is
almost three times as high (26 cents/hour). The hourly wage rates we record in self-employment are even higher (36
cents for ag self-employment, 56 for non-ag self-employment, and 71 cents for ag processing), but these should be
interpreted with some caution due to the complexity of telling net from gross income in self employment.
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employment as the apprenticeship phase of HD came to an end. In Figure B.10 we can indeed see
the elevated rate of apprenticeships for HD participants as program participation came to an end
(late 2018), which then contextualizes the uptick in productive hours visible in the prior table for
HD beneficiaries in the early months of 2019.
Summarizing this analysis, we see reasonable labor market effects of the HD program in a num-
ber of dimensions. We would not expect productive time use to improve during the intervention,
and our midline survey appears to come about six months after the labor market impacts emerge.
HD focuses on job training and on helping beneficiaries start agricultural enterprises, and it is
successful in both these endeavors. Because most of the individuals entering this work are leaving
agricultural wage employment or agricultural trading (which we also count as employment), the
headline employment rate does not shift substantially. Cash transfers, on the other hand, par-
ticularly strongly drive individuals away from agricultural wage work and into self-employment
(both agricultural and non-agricultural). So these two interventions have the effect of pushing
participants down somewhat different paths towards income generation.
3.2 Cost-Equivalent Benchmarking
We pre-specified a regression adjustment strategy for benchmarking HD at an exactly cost-equivalent
level using the ex-post costing data from both programs. First, begin with the total GD donor cost
per study subject within each transfer amount arm, denoted by tc (this is the final column in Table
3). Subtract from this number the benchmarked HD cost per household C from the same column,
and denote the difference tc − C = τc; this is the deviation (positive or negative) of each GD arm
from the benchmarked HD cost. Set τc to zero in the control and HD arms. We can then re-run
regression (1) above omitting the combined arm, and controlling for a linear term in τc, a dummy
for either treatment, and a dummy for receiving HD:
Yihb1 = δ
TTihb + δ
HDTHDibh + βXihb0 + ρYihb0 + γ1τc + µb + +ihb1 (2)
In this specification Tihb is a dummy variable indicating that individual i in household h of
randomization block b was assigned to any treatment (HD or GD). Subject to the assumption of
linear transfer amount effects, the slope coefficient τc captures impacts arising from deviations in
GD cost from HD cost, the coefficient δ effectively gives the impact of GD at the cost of HD, and
the dummy variable δHD provides a direct benchmarking test: the differential impact of HD over
GD at the same cost per eligible. We impose the simple linear functional form to preserve as much
statistical power as possible for the core cost-equivalent benchmarking comparison, although it is
straightforward to make this more flexible.
Table 6 shows the cost-equivalent benchmarking results for primary outcomes, and Table 7
for secondaries. Beginning with the third column we linearize across transfer arms and test the
marginal effect of receiving an additional $100 from GD. Remarkably, across all 17 outcomes we
do not have a single case where we can detect a significant slope across transfer amounts; indeed
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more than half of the transfer slope coefficients are negative.16 The takeaway seems to be that this
study features transfer amounts large enough to have cleared an impact threshold beyond which
additional amounts of money do not lead to meaningfully better outcomes. For the purposes of cost
adjustment, this result also indicates that the pre-specified way of using a linear transfer amount
control to adjust the GD impacts will not have a strong effect on the predicted cost-equivalent
outcome.
The second column, Cost-equivalent GD impact, reports the coefficient on an indicator for re-
ceiving any treatment. This estimates the effect of GD at the cost-equivalent level; here we see
as significant the outcomes already shown to be moved by GD (hours worked, income, productive
assets, consumption, subjective well-being, livestock wealth, and savings). In this pooled specifica-
tion and with regression adjustment we now get a small effect of cost-equivalent cash on business
attitudes, significant at the 10% level.
The first column, Differential impact of HD, presents the core of the comparative cost effective-
ness exercise that this study was built to conduct. Using the linearized cost adjustment it gives the
differential impact of HD relative to a cash transfer of precisely equal amount. The results indicate
that HD leads to somewhat lower monthly income and substantially fewer productive assets than
a cost-equivalent cash transfer. In terms of secondary outcomes, HD also does significantly worse
at driving subjective well-being, beneficiary consumption, and livestock wealth, and of all the out-
comes in the study only for the Business Knowledge index does HD do significantly better than
cash.
Appendix Figure B.11 provides graphical interpretation for our cost equivalent comparison,
using subjective well-being and business knowledge as outcomes. In this figure the grey circle plots
the Control in outcome/cost space, the four black circles represent the GD arms, and the black
diamond gives the actual HD outcome. The cost adjustment strategy first fits a linear regression of
the outcome by transfer amount in the GD arms (solid black line), then extrapolates this line to the
predicted value that would have obtained had the GD transfers exactly equalled the ex-post HD
cost (hollow circle). Mapping the picture to the regression estimands, then, the third column gives
the slope of the line, the second column gives the vertical differential between the predicted hollow
circle and the control, and the core cost equivalent test measures the vertical difference between
the hollow circle and the black diamond. This last quantity is the core purpose of our comparative
exercise, the difference between what we actually observed in HD and what we predict we would
have observed in GD at the exact same cost. For subjective well-being, despite an improvement in
HD over the control we see the predicted cash outcome being more than twice as a far above the
control. For business knowledge, it is clear that no amount of money generates an effect resembling
HD. Similar figures for all primary outcomes, along with a side-by-side comparison to a more
standard cost-effectiveness approach, are included in Figure 2 and discussed in Section 4.
These results illustrate the value of the double counterfactual created by the cash benchmarking
16This results stands in stark contrast to our previous benchmarking study (McIntosh and Zeitlin, 2019), in which
the GD Main cash transfer amounts were much smaller ($84 on average) and a sharp differentiation was visible
between these small transfers and the Large arm ($532).
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design. Compared to what would have happened in the absence of the program HD is successful,
leading to meaningful improvements in a number of the core outcomes it was designed to move.
Considering the cost of the program, however, and comparing to what would have happened if
this cost had been distributed directly to beneficiaries, the picture is less rosy. Given that the
direct distribution of these costs would have led to a surge in consumption and investment, the
hurdle for success is raised, and we find the HD program falling short across most outcomes. Unless
policymakers had a strong preference for the specific human capital built by HD and measured in our
Business knowledge index, over the 18 month time horizon the benefits of cash would dominate. It is
nonetheless impressive that HD managed to generate meaningful improvements in productive assets,
savings, and subjective well-being without having made any material transfers to beneficiaries.
Table 6: Cost-equivalent analysis: Primary outcomes
Differential impact
of HD
Cost-equivalent
GD impact
Transfer
Value
Control
Mean Obs. R2
Employed −0.01 0.04 −0.00 0.48 1578 0.17
(0.04) (0.04) (0.01)
[0.60] [0.33] [0.60]
Productive hours −2.25 5.05∗∗ −0.66 18.64 1578 0.19
(2.19) (2.14) (0.56)
[0.29] [0.05] [0.27]
Monthly income −0.71∗ 0.99∗∗ −0.02 8.05 1578 0.22
(0.32) (0.33) (0.09)
[0.05] [0.01] [0.60]
Productive assets −2.27∗∗∗ 3.83∗∗∗ 0.03 5.61 1578 0.27
(0.43) (0.44) (0.12)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.60]
HH consumption per
capita
−0.13 0.19∗∗ 0.03 9.46 1548 0.31
(0.08) (0.08) (0.02)
[0.12] [0.04] [0.16]
Note: This table uses a linear adjustment of primary outcomes for program cost to compare HD and GD at exactly
equivalent costs. The Transfer value column estimates the marginal effect of spending an extra $100 through cash
transfers. The Cost-equivalent GD impact column is estimated as a dummy for either HD or GD treatment, and
estimates the impact of cash at the exact cost of HD. The Differential impact of HD column then estimates the
differential effect of HD above cash at this benchmarked cost. Regressions include but do not report the lagged
dependent variable, fixed effects for randomization blocks, and a set of LASSO-selected baseline covariates, and are
weighted to reflect intensive tracking. Standard errors are (in soft brackets) are clustered at the household level
to reflect the design effect, and p-values corrected for False Discovery Rates across all the outcomes in the table
are presented in hard brackets. Stars on coefficient estimates are derived from the FDR-corrected p-values, *=10%,
**=5%, and ***=1% significance. Employed is a dummy variable for spending more than 10 hours per week working
for a wage or as primary operator of a microenterprise. Productive hours are measured over prior 7 days in all activities
other than own-farm agriculture. Monthly income, productive assets, and household consumption are winsorized at
1% and 99% and analyzed in Inverse Hyperbolic Sine, meaning that treatment effects can be interpreted as percent
changes.
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Table 7: Cost-equivalent analysis: Secondary outcomes
Differential impact
of HD
Cost-equivalent
GD impact
Transfer
Value
Control
Mean Obs. R2
Panel A. Beneficiary welfare
Subjective well-being −0.23∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.03 0.00 1578 0.16
(0.08) (0.09) (0.02)
[0.01] [0.00] [0.23]
Mental health −0.00 −0.04 0.03 0.00 1578 0.08
(0.09) (0.09) (0.02)
[0.50] [0.50] [0.23]
Beneficiary-specific
consumption
−0.44∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ −0.02 8.27 1578 0.24
(0.12) (0.12) (0.04)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.50]
Panel B. Household wealth
HH net non-land
wealth
−0.80 0.62 0.15 11.28 1578 0.21
(0.49) (0.48) (0.12)
[0.30] [0.35] [0.35]
HH livestock wealth −1.92∗∗∗ 1.90∗∗∗ 0.09 7.81 1578 0.27
(0.45) (0.46) (0.12)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.52]
Savings −0.10 1.13∗∗∗ 0.08 9.24 1578 0.21
(0.28) (0.29) (0.08)
[0.52] [0.00] [0.46]
Debt 0.57 −0.16 −0.06 8.75 1578 0.21
(0.39) (0.39) (0.11)
[0.35] [0.52] [0.52]
Panel C. Beneficiary cognitive and non-cognitive skills
Locus of control −0.00 0.07 −0.00 0.00 1578 0.29
(0.08) (0.08) (0.02)
[1.00] [0.99] [1.00]
Aspirations −0.06 0.06 −0.00 0.00 1578 0.08
(0.09) (0.08) (0.02)
[0.99] [0.99] [1.00]
Big Five index −0.01 0.13 −0.04 0.00 1578 0.11
(0.09) (0.09) (0.02)
[1.00] [0.76] [0.76]
Business knowledge 0.54∗∗∗ 0.11 −0.03 0.00 1578 0.23
(0.09) (0.09) (0.02)
[0.00] [0.76] [0.82]
Business attitudes −0.09 0.21∗ −0.03 0.00 1578 0.09
(0.08) (0.08) (0.02)
[0.82] [0.09] [0.76]
Note: This table uses a linear adjustment of secondary outcomes for program cost to compare HD and GD at
exactly equivalent costs. The Transfer value column estimates the marginal effect of spending an extra $100 through
cash transfers. The Cost-equivalent GD impact column is estimated as a dummy for either HD or GD treatment,
and estimates the impact of cash at the exact cost of HD. The Differential impact of HD column then estimates
the differential effect of HD above cash at this benchmarked cost. Regressions include but do not report the lagged
dependent variable, fixed effects for randomization blocks, and a set of LASSO-selected baseline covariates, and are
weighted to reflect intensive tracking. Standard errors are (in soft brackets) are clustered at the household level
to reflect the design effect, and p-values corrected for False Discovery Rates across all outcomes within each family
are presented in hard brackets. Stars on coefficient estimates are derived from the FDR-corrected p-values, *=10%,
**=5%, and ***=1% significance.
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3.3 Complementarities
Next, we present a canonical statistical analysis of complementarities. To do this, we use only
the control, the HD arm, the middle GD transfer, and the combined arm (who received HD and
the middle GD transfer). This sets up a standard 2x2 design that cross-cuts the two treatments.
Secondly, we redefine the treatment dummies so that we include one control for ‘any HD’ (HD
or combined), one for ‘any GD’ (GD or combined), and a dummy for the combined arm. Using
this approach, the ‘combined’ arm dummy now measures not the difference relative to the control
but instead whether there is an additional impact from the combination of HD and GD that is
greater than what would be expected by adding together the independent HD and GD effects. It is
therefore a direct test of complementarities; whether the whole of the combined arm is something
different than the sum of the two parts.
Across the board, the evidence in Tables 8 and 9 suggests that far from finding positive com-
plementarities, the whole appears to be less than the sum of the parts. The sign on the core test
(column 3) is negative for all primary outcomes and for two thirds of secondary outcomes. The
complementarity is significantly negative for productive hours and subjective well-being.
Complex, multi-dimensional programs are often justified on the grounds that poverty presents a
range of constraints, meaning that individuals are unable to benefit unless more than one constraint
is relaxed at once. Here we find that the effort to reduce human capital and physical capital barriers
simultaneously generates no additional benefit. Outcomes that are driven by cash are not further
helped by HD, outcomes driven by HD are not further helped by cash, and for two of our key
outcomes the combination is actually worse than what we would expect from the independent
effect of the two programs. On the other hand, by chance we have a circumstance where the cost
of the Combined arm is very similar to the GD Large arm, and we also do not find evidence that
the increase in cash transfer amounts from the Main to the Large transfer amounts is worthwhile.
The combined message is then that both efforts to increase expenditure per household from $300
to $750 were not justified, and more moderate expenditure amounts would dominate in a standard
cost-benefit sense.
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Table 8: Complementarities: Primary outcomes
HD GD Complementarity
Control
Mean Obs. R2
Employed 0.03 0.06 −0.08 0.48 1289 0.18
(0.03) (0.05) (0.06)
[0.27] [0.18] [0.18]
Productive hours 3.41∗∗ 7.23∗∗∗ −8.18∗∗ 18.64 1289 0.22
(1.58) (2.37) (3.13)
[0.04] [0.01] [0.02]
Monthly income 0.35 1.15∗∗∗ −0.44 8.05 1289 0.22
(0.26) (0.34) (0.45)
[0.18] [0.00] [0.26]
Productive assets 1.57∗∗∗ 3.79∗∗∗ −0.87 5.61 1289 0.26
(0.36) (0.51) (0.68)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.18]
HH consumption per
capita
0.06 0.28∗∗∗ −0.09 9.46 1260 0.36
(0.06) (0.09) (0.11)
[0.26] [0.01] [0.31]
Notes: HD, GD indicators defined as taking value of one if individual is in either the corresponding arm or the
combined arm. Complementarity column reports the differential effect of being in the combined arm, compared to
the sum of HD and GD impacts. Among individuals assigned to GD, only the mid-sized transfer arm is included in
this analysis. Regressions include but do not report the lagged dependent variable, fixed effects for randomization
blocks, and a set of LASSO-selected baseline covariates, and are weighted to reflect intensive tracking. Standard
errors are (in soft brackets) are clustered at the household level to reflect the design effect, and p-values corrected
for False Discovery Rates across all the outcomes in the table are presented in hard brackets. Stars on coefficient
estimates are derived from the FDR-corrected p-values, *=10%, **=5%, and ***=1% significance.
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Table 9: Complementarities: Secondary outcomes
HD GD Complementarity
Control
Mean Obs. R2
Panel A. Beneficiary welfare
Subjective well-being 0.20∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ −0.32∗∗ 0.00 1289 0.16
(0.07) (0.10) (0.13)
[0.01] [0.00] [0.02]
Mental health −0.03 0.08 0.07 0.00 1289 0.09
(0.07) (0.10) (0.14)
[0.43] [0.35] [0.43]
Beneficiary-specific
consumption
0.17 0.64∗∗∗ −0.08 8.27 1289 0.25
(0.12) (0.14) (0.18)
[0.17] [0.00] [0.43]
Panel B. Household wealth
HH net non-land
wealth
−0.20 1.13∗∗ −0.06 11.28 1289 0.21
(0.40) (0.45) (0.71)
[0.70] [0.03] [0.87]
HH livestock wealth −0.03 1.92∗∗∗ 0.33 7.81 1289 0.26
(0.37) (0.52) (0.70)
[0.87] [0.00] [0.70]
Savings 1.05∗∗∗ 1.27∗∗∗ −0.62 9.24 1289 0.23
(0.24) (0.34) (0.43)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.25]
Debt 0.45 −0.24 −0.23 8.75 1289 0.24
(0.28) (0.42) (0.57)
[0.21] [0.70] [0.70]
Panel C. Beneficiary cognitive and non-cognitive skills
Locus of control 0.05 0.01 0.16 0.00 1289 0.29
(0.06) (0.08) (0.11)
[0.51] [0.64] [0.43]
Aspirations −0.00 −0.04 0.19 0.00 1289 0.12
(0.07) (0.10) (0.13)
[0.64] [0.63] [0.43]
Big Five index 0.12 0.11 −0.20 0.00 1289 0.12
(0.07) (0.09) (0.13)
[0.39] [0.43] [0.43]
Business knowledge 0.66∗∗∗ 0.07 −0.11 0.00 1289 0.24
(0.08) (0.10) (0.14)
[0.00] [0.51] [0.51]
Business attitudes 0.12 0.16 −0.15 0.00 1289 0.10
(0.07) (0.09) (0.12)
[0.39] [0.39] [0.43]
Notes: HD, GD indicators defined as taking value of one if individual is in either the corresponding arm or the
combined arm. Complementarity column reports the differential effect of being in the combined arm, compared to
the sum of HD and GD impacts. Among individuals assigned to GD, only the mid-sized transfer arm is included in
this analysis. Regressions include but do not report the lagged dependent variable, fixed effects for randomization
blocks, and a set of LASSO-selected baseline covariates, and are weighted to reflect intensive tracking. Standard
errors are (in soft brackets) are clustered at the household level to reflect the design effect, and p-values corrected
for False Discovery Rates across all the outcomes in the table are presented in hard brackets. Stars on coefficient
estimates are derived from the FDR-corrected p-values, *=10%, **=5%, and ***=1% significance.
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3.4 Analysis of Heterogeneity
Our pre-analysis plan indicates four baseline dimensions over which we would look for signs of
heterogeneity. These are gender, household consumption per capita, risk aversion (measured by
the choices in a Binswanger–Eckel–Grossman lottery) and local labor market conditions (the em-
ployment rate within each of the 67 ‘cells’ of the study).17 Following the PAP, we use a standard
interaction between treatment indicators and baseline characteristics to study heterogeneity across
these baseline covariates, and examine only primary outcomes. The covariates are demeaned prior
to interaction so that the uninteracted coefficient should be interpreted as impact at the mean of
the interaction variable. To avoid interpretation issues arising from co-linearity, we omit both the
baseline outcome (ANCOVA) and also the LASSO-selected covariates that are included but not
reported for all the prior regressions.
Results of subgroup analyses by gender, risk, consumption, and cell-level employment shares
are presented in Appendix Tables A.8, A.9, A.10, and A.11, respectively. Overall, we find very little
evidence of meaningful heterogeneity in the impact of the program across these four dimensions.
Gender itself has a huge effect (female beneficiaries are less likely to be employed, put in fewer
productive hours, and have lower levels of income and assets), but none of the interventions affect
women in a manner significantly different than men. It is important to recognize, however, that
power starts to become a greater concern as we split the study into smaller cells. Reading point
estimates, we see that in fact HD does lead to a 9 pp increase in employment rates among men, while
women see a 3 pp deterioration in employment rates during HD. These effects are not significant,
however, because the minimum detectable effect on HD among men is 10 pp, and on the gender
interaction is 14 pp. Table A.9 shows the risk averse being somewhat better at translating the
interventions into income, with few other differences. Encouragingly, Table A.10 shows impacts
that are relatively invariant to baseline consumption, indicating that both cash and HD are equally
effective for the very poor (the GD Large arm has slightly larger benefits, and the Combined arm
slightly larger benefits, for those with higher consumption at baseline). Given that many related
programs have had an easier time creating benefits for the non-poor, this suggests that both of
the interventions studied here should be considered good candidates for heavily poverty-targeted
programs. Baseline employment rates, studied in Table A.11, are not only not driving the impacts
of the program but appear to be completely uncorrelated with outcomes overall. Finally, based on
feedback from the Rwanda USAID mission, we included age as a dimension of heterogeneity, and
again in Table A.12 find no evidence of differences. The bottom row of all of these tables shows the
p-value on F-tests of joint significance across the four interaction terms (note these are based on
the non-FDR-adjusted significance rates); we present 25 such omnibus tests and find two of them
to be significant at the 10% level, fewer than we would expect by random chance. Hence, taken
17We filed our initial PAP with the AEA and then subsequently submitted to the Journal of Development Eco-
nomics’ pre-registry facility. In the time between these two submissions we came to realize that the data from the
Convex Time Budget exercise we conducted at baseline (Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012) had not produced meaningful
results. As a result we dropped the analysis of heterogeneity using discount rates and hyperbolicity derived from the
CTB, and present here only the heterogeneity tests included in the later PAP filed with the JDE.
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together the analysis of heterogeneity suggests programs that are having consistent and similar
effects across different types of beneficiaries and across local labor market conditions.
3.5 Spillovers
Spillovers are of central interest in this project for several reasons. First, for both of the programs
being studied here recent literatures suggest that we should be concerned with impacts on non-
beneficiaries. Cre´pon et al. (2013) show that most of the benefits of job training programs in France
come from diverting a fixed set of job opportunities towards treated individuals and away from
untreated ones. Cash transfer programs appear to have complex spillovers on non-beneficiaries,
with Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009) and Egger et al. (2019) finding potential positive spillovers
through family or labor market mechanisms, with other studies suggesting negative spillovers to
non-beneficiaries (Haushofer and Shapiro, 2016; McIntosh and Zeitlin, 2019), particularly in terms
of mental health (Baird et al., 2013). Because our study uses an individually randomized design
these spillovers are a direct threat to internal validity, and so this test is critical.
We look for spillovers both on program participation and on primary outcomes. While in
principle there may be externalities of each program at several levels of contact, we focus on
spillovers that are local, in the sense that they occur between individuals who reside in the same
village at baseline.18 The reason for doing so is both substantive—this is plausibly the level at
which such interactions are most salient—as well as practical: since the randomization is blocked
at the sector level, and provides no variation in treatment saturation at that or higher levels.
Let Twivb denote the assignment of individual i in village v to treatment w ∈ {GDM,GDL,HD},
where we pool the three smaller cash-transfer values into a single arm, w = GDM, as distinct
from the larger transfer value, w = GDL. Individuals in the combined arm have TGDSivb = T
HD
ivb =
1. Define Tivb = [T
GDM
ivb , T
GDL
ivb , T
HD
ivb ] as the vector denoting individual i’s treatment status.
Finally, we let the vector T¯−i,vb = [T¯GDM−i,vb , T¯
GDL
−i,vb , T¯
HD
−i,vb] denote the average treatment status of
study individuals other than individual i in village v for each of the three treatments (that is,
the saturation of each treatment among others in the village), and we adopt the convention that
T¯−i,vb = 0 if individual i is the only study participant in village v. This vector of village-level
saturations is randomly assigned through the household-level lottery, and is independent of the
own-treatment terms because we calculate saturations among others in the village. The densities
of the treatment saturations are plotted in Figure B.12.
3.5.1 Spillovers on Compliance
Using this notation, we can represent the three types of spillover analysis conducted, in increasing
order of complexity. First, we analyze whether there are spillover effects on the rate at which
18 We conducted a social network survey measuring connections to other individuals in the study at baseline
that we had intended to use for this analysis, but we found that a) networks within villages are typically completely
connected, and b) we were unable to collect this data for a small subset of beneficiaries. Because the simple treatment
saturation in the village maps almost perfectly to the saturation in the social network and is universally observable,
we use it for our analysis.
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individuals choose to participate in Huguka Dukore (this question is not interesting for GD because
compliance is so close to universal). A major concern during the study design phase was that the
assignment of one’s peers to cash would discourage participation with HD. To do this, we use only
the HD arm and estimate the following linear probability model:
E[Pwivb|T¯−i,vb] = µwb + φwT¯−i,vb (3)
where PWivb is a measure of individual i’s participation in treatment w ∈ {HD,Combined}.
Table 10 illustrates that the density of GD treatment in a village does not drive compliance.
The first column analyzes compliance within the standalone HD arm, and the second column within
the Combined arm. The point estimates on the GD saturation rates are zero or positive, and never
significant. Instead, this table shows that HD compliance is driven by the Huguka Dukore treatment
saturation; the point estimate in the standalone HD arm is significant at the 5% level and suggests
that as an HD participant goes from having no-one else in the village treated to everyone else in
the village treated, we can expect compliance to increase by 27 pp. Since HD in the absence our of
experiment would naturally attempt to treat 100% of the willing and eligible individuals considered
in this study, that means that our study features a compliance rate that may be slightly too low
relative to the rate that would naturally occur. However, since the costing estimate is multiplied
times the observed compliance rate and the ITT is similarly a function of observed compliance in
our study, compliance falls out of the benefit/cost comparisons that we make (it is in both the
numerator and the denominator). This suggests that our estimates are still likely to be meaningful,
absent substantial Essential Heterogeneity in the sense of Heckman and Vytlacil (2005).
Next, we can take our study of spillovers to the primary outcomes used in the study. We first
use a more parsimonious specification that looks for average spillover effects from each type of
treatment saturation to the other members of the village. Table 11 conducts this analysis and
uncovers no evidence of spillovers in outcomes; not only are none of the saturation rates for any
of the three treatments significant, but the sign of the coefficients alternates signs across outcomes
for all three treatment saturations.
For outcome Yivb1, we modify the specification of equation used to estimate ITT effects (equation
1) as follows:
Yivb1 = δ1Tivb + δ2T¯−i,vb + βXivb0 + ρYivb0 + µb + εivb1. (4)
Finally, we use the full model from our PAP that allows for the estimation of spillovers both
from each treatment arm, and on to each treatment arm:
Yivb1 = δ1Tivb + δ2T¯−i,vb + δ3TivbT¯−i,vb + βXivb0 + ρYivb0 + µb + εivb1. (5)
In equation (5), the three coefficients in δ2 provide a test of the spillover effects of each of the
three treatments onto control individuals, and the nine coefficients in the vector δ3 test for whether
the spillover effects from the saturations of any of the three treatments on to individuals directly
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Table 10: Spillovers on Program Compliance
HD Combined
HD Saturation 0.27∗∗ 0.09
(0.09) (0.17)
[0.01] [0.85]
GD Main
Saturation
0.13 −0.01
(0.08) (0.14)
[0.45] [1.00]
GD Large
Saturation
0.12 0.15
(0.14) (0.26)
[0.85] [0.85]
Average compliance 0.86 0.90
Observations 466 192
R2 0.32 0.55
p-value 0.01 0.85
Notes: Table uses a Linear Probability Model to examine the likelihood that an individual assigned to that arm
participates in Huguka Dukore (Column 1) or the HD component of the Combined arm (Column 2), as a function of
the saturation of each of the three treatments among other members of the same village. Regressions include but do
not report the lagged dependent variable, fixed effects for randomization blocks, and a set of LASSO-selected baseline
covariates, and are weighted to reflect intensive tracking. Standard errors are (in soft brackets) are clustered at the
household level to reflect the design effect, and p-values corrected for False Discovery Rates across all the outcomes in
the table are presented in hard brackets. Stars on coefficient estimates are derived from the FDR-corrected p-values,
*=10%, **=5%, and ***=1% significance. Bottom row is the p-value on an F-test of the joint significance of the
three saturation terms.
receiving each of the three treatments differ from the control.19
The five Appendix Tables A.13, A.14, A.15, A.16, and A.17 present this analysis Because of
the large number of hypotheses being tested we present the analysis for each outcome in a separate
table. Each of these analyses shows results from a single regression with the three different sets of
treatment by saturation interactions stacked as adjacent columns. Again, this analysis is remarkably
clear and consistent in showing an absence of spillover effects. Using significance levels derived from
within-regression false discovery corrections we do not have a single significant spillover effect in
the control, or differential effect for any treatment, across any of the 60 spillover tests performed
here. Using unadjusted p-values we find 4 of these comparisons significant at the 10% level and
none at the 5% level, in line with random chance.
Figure 1 provides a graphical take on this analysis, showing the predicted outcome for each
treatment group (in rows) and primary outcome(in columns). Using the observed treatment sat-
urations and the estimated saturation slopes, this exercise predicts the outcome we would expect
to see within each arm and outcome as the local intensity of treatment changes, with the spe-
19We report cluster-robust standard errors for each of the coefficients, clustering at the village level. In addition,
given the large number of hypotheses tested in these regressions (sixteen) we correct the p-values in these regressions
using Anderson’s (2008) False Discovery Rate correction across all coefficients within each regression.
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Table 11: Spillover effects: levels model
Employed
Productive
Hours
Monthly
Income
Productive
Assets Consumption
HD 0.01 0.91 0.22 1.16∗∗∗ 0.05
(0.03) (1.25) (0.20) (0.30) (0.05)
[1.00] [1.00] [0.93] [0.00] [1.00]
GD main 0.01 2.73 0.90∗∗∗ 3.49∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗
(0.03) (1.28) (0.19) (0.26) (0.04)
[1.00] [0.13] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
GD Huge treatment 0.00 0.18 0.70 3.81∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗
(0.04) (1.92) (0.34) (0.46) (0.07)
[1.00] [1.00] [0.13] [0.00] [0.00]
HD Saturation 0.01 −1.80 −0.08 −0.01 0.02
(0.06) (2.75) (0.45) (0.66) (0.10)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
GD Main Saturation −0.00 0.41 −0.39 0.75 −0.01
(0.06) (2.77) (0.42) (0.59) (0.09)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [0.77] [1.00]
GD Large Saturation −0.11 −9.89 0.15 0.12 −0.07
(0.10) (4.85) (0.72) (1.04) (0.16)
[0.93] [0.13] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
Control mean 0.48 18.64 8.05 5.61 9.46
Observations 1770 1770 1770 1770 1737
R2 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.26 0.33
p-value 0.69 0.23 0.79 0.64 0.96
Notes: Table analyzes spillover effects of the three main treatments (HD, GD Main, and GD Large) on the five
primary outcomes. The first three rows are dummy variables for own treatment status, and the next three are the
saturation rates for the three treatments among others in the village, so measure the marginal effect of going from
no-one else treated to everyone else treated. Regressions include but do not report the lagged dependent variable,
fixed effects for randomization blocks, and a set of LASSO-selected baseline covariates, and are weighted to reflect
intensive tracking. Standard errors are (in soft brackets) are clustered at the household level to reflect the design
effect, and p-values corrected for False Discovery Rates across all the outcomes in the table are presented in hard
brackets. Stars on coefficient estimates are derived from the FDR-corrected p-values, *=10%, **=5%, and ***=1%
significance. Bottom row is the p-value on an F-test of the joint significance of the three saturation terms.
cific treatment saturations generating the spillovers plotted as different colored fitted lines in each
graph. The only visual signs of spillovers are restricted to the GD Large arm (which in reality has
a limited variation in the saturations), while the HD and GD Main arms which are the core of the
benchmarking exercise appear completely invariant to local intensity of treatment.
It therefore appears that we can quite simply conclude that our study did not generate detectable
within-village spillover effects on outcomes. While our blocked lotteries do not allow us to study
the kinds of cross-village General Equilibrium (GE) effects generated in Egger et al. (2019), the
size of our transfers are tiny relative to local GDP and it appears unlikely that we would have
generated meaningful local GE effects. We do not see the kind of zero-sum diversionary treatment
effects uncovered by job-training programs in more formalized labor markets (Cre´pon et al., 2013),
presumably because a) our overall impact on employment was small, and b) the informal labor
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Figure 1: Expected outcomes by treatment arm, under alternative saturation rates
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markets in this context do not demonstrate a hard capacity constraint in the same way. The
invariance of outcomes to HD saturations suggests that the response of HD compliance to HD
saturations is not generating a study ITT that is driven by the lower treatment saturations induced
by the lottery. Comfortingly, the overall takeaway is that our analysis remains internally valid and
there is no need to attempt to correct for spillovers.
3.6 Tracing cash flows
In this question, we ask a question specific to the cash-transfer arms of our study: How have
participants used the funding they received? Tracing these cash flows facilitates understanding in
several ways. First, variation in the use of funds by the amount of cash received, and by the
provision of HD training alongside cash in the combined arm, may help us to understand the
mechanisms by which these arms deliver distinct impacts. Second, the extent to which we can
account for the full values of transfers received sheds light on whether there might be ‘missing’
dimensions of impact not accounted for in our evaluation. And third, the extent to which observed
patterns of spending are consistent with a simple spend-down of cash grants—and not a set of
investments likely to deliver future income gains—is indicative of the sustainability of the impacts
of cash.
Accounting for cash flows requires us to model both the inflows and the outflows induced by each
active treatment arm. Clearly, the core of the induced inflow is the value of cash itself received
by the beneficiary. But we also need to account for other income gains that each intervention
can cause. To do so, we estimate each arm’s impacts on beneficiary income and on transfers
received by the beneficiary household, and we include these as inflows. We then compare these
impacts on inflows with estimated impacts on expenditures, where our expenditure measures are a
mixture of flows—household consumption, and transfers and loans made to other households—as
well as stocks—savings, debt, livestock, and other productive assets. Flow measures vary in their
recall periods, with income and consumption measured over comparatively short recall periods (as
analyzed in Section 3.1, these are constructed as estimates for the month prior to the follow-up
survey) and transfers measured over a 12-month recall period.
We value impacts on each of these dimensions by multiplying estimated proportional impacts
of each program, from the specification in equation (1), by the average level of the corresponding
outcome at follow-up in the control group. We emulate the results of Section 3.1 for household
transfers in Appendix Table A.20. Together with the ITT results on primary and secondary out-
comes, and combined with estimates of control means, this allows us provide the estimated financial
impact of each program on both inflows and outflows.
The results of this exercise are presented in Table 12. In Panel A of that table, we estimate
impacts of each cash-transfer arm on households’ total income. This comprises not only the direct
value of transfers received, but also induced increases in beneficiary income and in transfers received
from other households. Since beneficiary income is measured over a short recall, we need to make
an assumption about its time path, and so we extrapolate over the 12 months since the cash
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Table 12: Accounting for cash transfers
Treatment effect
Control mean Lower Middle Upper Large Combined
Panel A. Inflows
Cash received 0.00 317.16 410.65 502.96 750.30 410.65
Beneficiary income 209.36 158.39 226.36 239.48 152.48 218.09
Transfers received 23.38 40.93 62.50 61.16 72.74 57.63
Total inflows . 516.47 699.51 803.60 975.53 686.37
Panel B. Outflows
Household consumption 625.85 124.50 166.53 146.10 223.08 169.13
Livestock 118.64 208.40 218.03 313.31 257.79 262.49
Productive assets 49.89 196.35 189.78 191.37 200.70 220.60
Savings 51.99 54.11 66.88 81.22 74.34 88.11
Debt 61.93 −5.93 −14.04 −34.77 −22.79 0.14
Loans made 3.83 3.46 1.74 5.41 2.61 4.74
Transfers made 4.53 3.08 8.48 2.56 1.46 3.65
Total outflows . 595.82 665.47 774.73 782.78 748.60
Panel C. Totals
Share accounted . 115% 95% 96% 80% 109%
Note. Table presents control means and estimated impacts on financial values, in dollars. Beneficiary income and
household consumption are estimated 12-month totals, assuming constant flows over the period between delivery of
cash transfers and follow-up. Inter-household transfers and loans are 12-month recall variables. All other variables are
stocks measured at follow-up. Total inflows are the sum of cash received, beneficiary income, and transfers received.
Total outflows are the sum of household consumption, livestock values, other productive asset values, savings values,
the negative of debt values, loans made, and transfers made. Share accounted is the ratio between total outflows and
total inflows.
transfer assuming a constant impact in all months. Whether this under- or over-states true financial
inflows will depend, among other things, on whether beneficiary income measures represent true
income effects or the spend-down of business stocks. We compare these impacts on cash inflows
with financial outflows, measured in Panel B. Those outlays include measures of flows including
household consumption, impacts on which are extrapolated as constant over the period since the
cash transfer, as well as loans and transfers made by the household, which are measured with a 12-
month recall, and so do not need to be extrapolated. They also include values of stocks at follow-up
of livestock, other productive assets, savings, and debt. Our total outflow measure is constructed
as the sum of the financial value of impacts on each of these categories, with impacts on debt
entering negatively. We then construct the share of cash inflows that can be accounted for by these
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measured dimensions as the ratio of total treatment-induced outflows to total treatment-induced
inflows for each arm.
We draw three basic conclusions from this exercise. First, the fact that induced outflows con-
stitute a large share of induced inflows in general suggests that our measures of financial assets and
expenditures are relatively complete, at least as far as is relevant to the impacts of these transfers.
Second, expenditure patterns do exhibit some differences across arms. For example, investments
in livestock and in other productive assets do not rise proportionally with the value of transfers.
Further, comparison between expenditure patterns in the Middle and Combined arms—for which
cash transfer values are equal—suggests that there are modest differences in the application of cash
induced by HD training. The Combined treatment seems to divert the flow of cash to livestock
and productive assets to a greater extent than the Middle arm, at the expense, in part, of debt
repayment. While these investments have not delivered increases in income at the time of follow-up,
it suggests that there remains a possibility that the Combined arm will cause differences in incomes
as these investments deliver returns over the long term.20 Third, while our ability to draw infer-
ences about the sustainability of cash-transfer impacts beyond the follow-up period is necessarily
speculative, there are two features of this exercise that point to sustainability. First, the consump-
tion impacts of the cash transfers are smaller than their income impacts in absolute terms. And
to the extent that a rapidly declining consumption path over the period prior to follow-up period
would have been indicative of a lack of sustainability, we note that under the current (generous)
assumption about total impacts on inflows, there is little unaccounted-for expenditure that could
have been part of a downward-sloping consumption pattern over time.
4 Value for Money
There are multiple ways that one can pose that most basic question in cost effectiveness: how can
policy spending achieve the greatest effect? Our study is designed to emphasize one comparison,
namely the cost equivalent one: if a comparable amount of money is to be spent per beneficiary
across programs, which achieves the greatest benefit? This approach holds both the beneficiary
pool and the spend per beneficiary fixed, and asks about comparative effectiveness.
A related but different question can be asked if one is willing to concentrate spending on a
subset of the beneficiary pool. This is comparative cost effectiveness: how can money be spent to
create the largest total benefit across the pool for a fixed overall budget? In Tables 4 and 5 when
we test for differences in the ratio of the effect sizes to the cost of the arm, this is the question we
are asking.
A visual comparison between the cost equivalence and the cost effectiveness approaches is
provided in Figure 2. In the left-hand column of figures, we illustrate the cost-equivalent comparison
20The differences in investments induced appear too small to have created meaningful differences in income over
the period studied. For example, if the differential livestock investment in the Combined arm versus the Middle
arm, of $262-$218=$44, was undertaken immediately after the transfer and paid an annuity value of 5 percent, the
resulting difference in incomes would have been just over $2 in total over the year since transfers occurred.
41
for the five primary outcomes. Here, the question is focused on a specific point on the x-axis, namely
the cost of HD (the black diamond), and the GD arms are pooled to estimate one counterfactual,
which is the predicted value at the HD cost. The Control need not even be included to execute
this comparison.
The right-hand column of Figure 2 plots the identical outcomes by arm, but uses them to
instead represent the cost effectiveness question in a visual way. The term value for money can
be thought of as the relationship between the vertical axis in these figures (the value generated in
terms of improved outcomes) over the horizontal axis (the money spent). Hence, the slope of the
line between the Control outcome and the outcome in each active treatment arm in this space is
a direct representation of benefit/cost across arms. The steepest slope has the highest value for
money, assuming that the donor is willing to be flexible regarding how the number of people treated
and therefore the cost per person. 21
In our study, the cost-equivalent question can be posed at one cost by design (the ex-post
cost of HD, compared to the extrapolated benefit of GD at that cost), and at another cost by
accident (because the Combined and HD Large arms turn out to have virtually identical costs).
The comparative cost-effectiveness question, on the other hand, is easily posed across costs since it
essentially compares the gradient of additional money at each modality and total cost. Comparative
cost effectiveness is therefore an attractive way to horse-race the GD arms against each other.
Given these two potential approaches, what does our study say about value for money? Be-
ginning with the central cost-equivalent comparison between HD and cash, the main results of the
paper suggest that for the $332 price tag of HD, one could produce significantly better outcomes
via cash transfers across productive assets, beneficiary consumption, and livestock wealth, and for
this amount of money HD is superior only at producing business knowledge. This result can help
policymakers with different objectives think about which type of intervention will best produce the
outcomes that they want to see.
Appendix Tables A.18 and A.19 provide estimates of cost effectiveness for primary and sec-
ondary outcomes, respectively, by dividing the ITT estimates by the cost of the arm in hundreds of
dollars, and testing for the differences across arms (this is the slope coefficient visually represented
in the right-hand panel of Figure 2). Seen in comparative cost effectiveness terms, the GD Middle
transfer appears to be superior overall. It has the highest benefit/cost ratio across four of the five
primary outcomes, losing only to the GD Small arm on productive asset value. Among secondary
outcomes, GD Middle wins or ties in terms of cost effectiveness for subjective well-being, beneficiary
consumption, and net household wealth. HD has higher cost effectiveness in driving savings, and
for business knowledge.
When we make the cost-equivalent comparison between the Combined arm and the GD Large
arm, we are asking the following question: given that we have already spent the $494 dollars to
21In the absence of general equilibrium effects, all points along these lines connecting average outcomes in active
treatment arms with the control group are achievable by mixing that treatment with a fraction of individuals left
untreated. In this sense, there is a lesser degree of extrapolation required for comparisons based on cost effectiveness
than for those based on cost equivalence.
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Figure 2: Cost Equivalence versus Cost Effectiveness
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deliver the GD Main arm, is it then better to spend another $350 to deliver HD on top of that
cash, or should that additional spending be used to amplify the cash transfer? Here, the answers
look quite different. There is now no outcome for which the GD Large arm is significantly better
than Combined, and the Combined arm continues to demonstrate HD’s advantage at producing
business knowledge. Why these divergent results? The answer appears to be evidence of diminishing
marginal benefits of cash; because HD is effective at driving many of the economic outcomes and
additional cash is having a weaker effect, we find these two interventions to have similar cost-
equivalent benefits even for outcomes on which cash ‘beat’ HD starting from zero. Overall, the
fact that in general the less expensive interventions produce superior outcomes in cost-effectiveness
terms says that we uncover no evidence for the idea that concentrating spending per person above
the levels seen in the GD Middle arm is justified.
5 Conclusions
This study undertakes an exercise increasingly called for in recent years: namely, a direct com-
parison of in-kind development aid to cash, in a study design that uses variation in cash transfer
values to identify cost-equivalent comparisons. The comparison program, Huguka Dukore, is a
well-established workforce readiness intervention, and the beneficiary group is one in which both
interventions have straightforward pathways to generate long-term improvements in welfare.
Our findings on the impacts of Huguka Dukore contribute to the evidence base on supply-side
active labor market programs, of which it is typical in design. Huguka Dukore appears successful
in increasing beneficiaries’ productive time use, as well as the stock of assets productive that they
accumulate. 18 months after program assignment, its participants report higher levels of subjective
well being, demonstrate improved business knowledge, and have increased their stocks of savings
considerably. HD has no significant effects on employment rates or beneficiary incomes. Given a
control-group endline average income of approximately USD 17.45 per month, our point estimates
on HD’s impacts on beneficiary income imply that approximately 61 months of earnings at this
rate would be required to pay back the realized costs to beneficiaries, consistent with supply-side
labor market policies elsewhere (McKenzie, 2017). But looking beneath the surface, we do see
exploratory evidence of shifts to microenterprise and even non-agricultural wage labor, which may
portend long-term labor-market impacts.
On the other hand, cash transfers to this population appear to have moved a wide range of
outcomes, including productive hours, incomes, productive assets, and household consumption.
These impacts are substantial for beneficiaries and provide a meaningful return on the costs of
intervention: for example, the cost to USAID of the middle transfer would be recuperated in
beneficiary income impacts alone after approximately 26 months. Secondary measures including
subjective well-being, household wealth, and savings are all meaningfully moved by these transfers.
Several lessons about the design mix of transfer programming are evident: there is no evidence of
complementarities between these cash-transfer impacts and the skills provided by HD, and increases
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in transfer size above the middle transfer amount of $411 included in our study do not appear
justified in cost-effectiveness terms.
It is worth noting a number of study limitations. First, the final costing number is substantially
lower than anticipated, meaning that the cost equivalent analysis must extrapolate to a cost lower
than anything observed in the GD transfer arms. Second, in order to achieve the benchmarking
we confine both implementers to somewhat unnatural sample selection rules. An organization
providing cash transfers would never have a reason to target only individuals who express interest
in a training program. For HD, the study constrained them to study only poor individuals (they
do not normally use Ubudehe status as a targeting criterion). We examine only a first phase
of implementation of HD, and we miss any environmental benefits to the employment landscape
caused by HD’s capacity building and job placement work. Also, because we induced HD to treat at
a lower intensity than they normally would (they would typically have treated all the individuals
in our study), we may not have captured the effect of a program running at greater intensity.
Nonetheless, the internal variation in our sample suggests that these issues would generate limited
bias in our study: outcomes are flat across transfer amount in GD (costing error), impacts are
homogeneous across a range of beneficiary characteristics (differential targeting rules), and we find
no evidence of saturation effects (HD treatment intensity). It therefore appears likely that our
study has reasonable external validity.
The comparative evaluation of cash and in-kind modalities in this study—together with exper-
imentally induced variation in cash transfer sizes—allows us to speak to the cash-benchmarking
question increasingly called for in recent years. How would beneficiary outcomes change if a stan-
dard and widespread development intervention were simply distributed to the beneficiaries in the
form of a mobile money transfer? Proponents of cash transfers have suggested that they should be
considered the ‘index funds’ of international development, meaning a benchmark to which other
programs are compared (Blattman and Niehaus, 2014). We estimate that at transfer values that
are cost-equivalent from the donor perspective, the impacts of cash transfers exceeds that of HD
by a statistically significant margin on two of five primary outcomes: monthly income and produc-
tive assets. On the other hand, given the substantially superior performance of HD at producing
the human capital measured by the business skills index, we can provide an exact exchange rate
that quantifies the tradeoffs policymakers must be willing to make. Focusing on the comparative
impacts on productive assets versus business skills, to prefer HD at 18 months policymakers must
be willing to forego a 200% increase in beneficiary productive assets in order to obtain a 0.5 SD
increase in human capital.
This approach to cash benchmarking holds donor expenditure per beneficiary constant—in ef-
fect, restricting comparisons of in-kind programs to cash transfers that could reach an equivalent
number of beneficiaries with equal-sized transfers. This need not be the optimal intensity of trans-
fers. A donor who seeks to maximize an additive social welfare function in any of the outcomes
considered, for example, would prefer to choose programming that maximizes the benefit-cost ratio.
Summarizing across outcomes, the middle of the cash transfer sizes considered in this study seems
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to perform best by this metric.
One of the most surprising results of our study is the lack of complementarities between GD and
HD. It is worth noting, however, that we designed the Combined arm to provide the cleanest test of
structural complementarities between physical and human capital from the beneficiary side, which
required that we implemented each arm precisely as in the standalone case. In reality, however,
these two programs could be interwoven in a number of deeper ways. At the very least, regular
programming intended to add capital over training would typically only do so at the end of the
training, while our Combined arm received their cash midway through HD. More fundamentally,
one might think about making the cash component conditional on participation in HD, which we
did not do. So our results should not be taken to mean that it is impossible to design cash and
training programs in a complementary manner, but rather than simply providing them together
does not automatically generate a whole greater than the sum of the parts. Given the many
complex, expensive, and multi-dimensional programs pushed by the donor community, this result
is worth paying attention to.
The lessons of this study add to the evidence base not just on specific programs, but on the
relative importance of the underlying constraints they seek to address. HD does appear to have
been effective in alleviating a human capital constraint: it improves business knowledge, though
non-cognitive dimensions such as aspirations and beneficiaries’ self-efficacy appear to have been
harder to move. In this context, the returns to raising business knowledge appear not to have
been as impactful as the returns to alleviating liquidity constraints through cash transfers. And
the liquidity constraints faced by these individuals appear not to be exceedingly large, given that
the returns to increases in cash-transfer size are modest. While our prior cash-benchmarking study
in Rwanda (McIntosh and Zeitlin, 2019) targeted households with malnourished children, it also
focused on Rwandans within Ubudehe 1 and 2, and so provides an interesting point of comparison
to the results here. That study provided evidence that transfer sizes greater than USD 150 are
required to induce changes in productive outcomes in this setting, but here we find transfers larger
than USD 400 have limited additional value. This helps to identify the ‘sweet spot’ for cash in this
context. Moreover, this study shows that the impact of human-capital and liquidity improvements
flow through different channels, in particular as the HD program does move beneficiaries in the
direction of wage employment, whereas cash transfers support self-employment. Importantly, these
results are at 18-months only. The long-run impact of the mechanisms induced by each of these
programs remains an important question.
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Appendix A Supplementary tables
Table A.1: Process of identifying the eligible sample
Sector Orientation sign-ups Verified eligible Baseline completed
Kaduha 273 261 235
Kibumbwe 144 139 127
Kigabiro 66 52 49
Kiyumba 102 70 66
Mugano 244 198 196
Muhazi 192 170 159
Munyaga 157 137 124
Munyiginya 115 102 94
Musange 170 115 110
Mushishiro 88 87 82
Nyakariro 227 200 190
Nyarusange 245 226 214
Shyogwe 252 210 202
Total 2275 1967 1848
Notes: Table gives the number of individuals participating in each of three phases of study recruitment, for each of
the 13 sectors in which recruitment took place.
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Table A.2: Survey modules by instrument and round
Module Baseline instrument Endline instrument
Identification Both Both
Social network Beneficiary —
Firm creation and employment history Beneficiary —
Wage employment Beneficiary Beneficiary
Microenterprise activities and assets Both Both
Time use Beneficiary Beneficiary
Income Both Beneficiary
Savings Both Both
Borrowing Both Both
Lending Both Both
Business contacts Beneficiary —
Private consumption Beneficiary Beneficiary
Private assets Beneficiary Beneficiary
Psychometrics Beneficiary Beneficiary
Raven’s test Beneficiary —
Digit-span recall Beneficiary —
Numeracy Beneficiary —
Lottery choice Beneficiary —
Convex time budget Beneficiary —
Locus of control Beneficiary Beneficiary
Big Five — Beneficiary
Aspirations — Beneficiary
Mental health — Beneficiary
Business knowledge — Beneficiary
Business attitudes — Beneficiary
Program participation — Beneficiary
Gender empowerment — Beneficiary
Household roster Household Household
Dwelling characteristics Household Household
Land use and ownership Household Household
Inter-household transfers Household Household
Consumption Household Household
Dietary diversity Household Household
Household assets Household Household
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Table A.3: Correlates of HD Participation
Huguka Dukore stage completed. . .
Complier Work Ready Now Be Your Own Boss Technical Training
Ubudehe category I 0.0106 0.0146 0.0128 −0.0199
(0.0281) (0.0319) (0.0356) (0.0327)
Beneficiary female 0.0142 0.0146 0.0284 −0.0187
(0.0285) (0.0317) (0.0363) (0.0336)
Beneficiary age 0.0120∗∗∗ 0.0100∗∗ 0.0085∗ 0.0067
(0.0041) (0.0048) (0.0052) (0.0042)
Beneficiary years of
education
0.0037 0.0051 0.0050 0.0073
(0.0061) (0.0071) (0.0083) (0.0073)
Household members 0.0025 0.0061 0.0083 0.0146∗
(0.0074) (0.0078) (0.0085) (0.0079)
Employed 0.0930∗ 0.0757 0.0846 0.0450
(0.0504) (0.0555) (0.0615) (0.0590)
Productive hours −0.0038∗∗∗ −0.0041∗∗∗ −0.0047∗∗∗ −0.0044∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0014)
Monthly income −0.0019 −0.0008 0.0004 −0.0026
(0.0045) (0.0051) (0.0055) (0.0050)
Productive assets −0.0001 0.0004 −0.0016 −0.0027
(0.0030) (0.0037) (0.0041) (0.0040)
HH consumption per
capita
0.0027 0.0042 0.0103 0.0157
(0.0134) (0.0152) (0.0179) (0.0154)
Beneficiary-specific
consumption
−0.0092∗ −0.0139∗∗ −0.0109∗ −0.0021
(0.0053) (0.0059) (0.0064) (0.0058)
HH net non-land
wealth
0.0030 0.0040∗ 0.0050∗ 0.0026
(0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0028) (0.0024)
Savings −0.0018 −0.0028 −0.0023 −0.0030
(0.0033) (0.0036) (0.0041) (0.0036)
Debt 0.0080∗∗ 0.0099∗∗∗ 0.0096∗∗ 0.0086∗∗
(0.0034) (0.0038) (0.0042) (0.0038)
HH livestock wealth 0.0025 0.0025 −0.0003 −0.0034
(0.0026) (0.0030) (0.0033) (0.0030)
Business Knowledge −0.0129 0.0056 0.0019 −0.0151
(0.0135) (0.0154) (0.0179) (0.0156)
Average completion rate 0.86 0.79 0.69 0.48
Observations 668 668 668 668
R2 0.12 0.16 0.18 0.47
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
Notes: Table estimates Linear Probability Model for four measures of progression through the Huguka Dukore
program: attending the first week of the WRN coursework and hence triggering payment to the implementer, then
completing each of the three subsequent components of the program. Rows are the baseline covariates over which we
look for heterogeneity in these compliance rates. p-value in the final row is from F-test on the joint significance of
all of the covariates. Standard errors in parentheses; *=10%, **=5%, and ***=1% significance
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Table A.4: Sampling of Attritors for Intensive Tracking Exercise
Intensive tracking Control mean Observations R2
Ubudehe category I −0.10 0.38 120 0.01
(0.09)
[1.00]
Beneficiary female −0.00 0.62 122 0.00
(0.09)
[1.00]
Beneficiary age 1.66 22.64 122 0.06
(0.61)
[0.13]
Beneficiary years of
education
0.07 8.10 122 0.00
(0.45)
[1.00]
Household members −0.25 4.66 122 0.00
(0.37)
[1.00]
Employed −0.00 0.31 122 0.00
(0.09)
[1.00]
Productive hours 2.48 11.75 122 0.00
(4.09)
[1.00]
Monthly income −0.41 4.15 122 0.00
(0.91)
[1.00]
Productive assets 0.65 2.59 122 0.00
(0.85)
[1.00]
HH consumption per
capita
0.14 9.44 122 0.00
(0.20)
[1.00]
Beneficiary-specific
consumption
0.08 7.61 122 0.00
(0.36)
[1.00]
HH net non-land
wealth
0.95 10.48 122 0.01
(1.02)
[1.00]
Savings 0.42 7.67 122 0.00
(0.83)
[1.00]
Debt −0.21 7.60 122 0.00
(0.86)
[1.00]
HH livestock wealth 2.22 5.26 122 0.04
(1.09)
[0.37]
Business Knowledge 0.34 −0.02 122 0.03
(0.18)
[0.37]
Notes: Table regresses a sequence of covariates on a dummy variable for having been sampled for intensive track-
ing, within the sample of original attritors. Standard errors in parentheses, p-values corrected for False Discovery
Rate across whole table in hard brackets; stars are based on FDR-adjusted values, *=10%, **=5%, and ***=1%
significance. 56
Table A.5: Intent-to-treat analysis: Primary outcomes, aggregated specification
GiveDirectly Control p-values
HD Main Large Combined Mean Obs. R2 (a) (b) (c)
Employed 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.48 1770 0.16 0.89 0.52 0.46
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
[0.29] [0.24] [0.51] [0.51]
Productive hours 2.80∗ 4.34∗∗∗ 1.12 2.33 18.64 1770 0.18 0.93 0.03 0.07
(1.57) (1.65) (2.06) (2.03)
[0.07] [0.01] [0.35] [0.17]
Monthly income 0.32 1.00∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗ 1.04∗∗∗ 8.05 1770 0.21 0.11 0.02 0.10
(0.26) (0.25) (0.35) (0.32)
[0.16] [0.00] [0.03] [0.00]
Productive assets 1.54∗∗∗ 3.86∗∗∗ 4.02∗∗∗ 4.42∗∗∗ 5.61 1770 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.35) (0.34) (0.47) (0.44)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
HH consumption per
capita
0.05 0.23∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 9.46 1737 0.33 0.05 0.64 0.17
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
[0.23] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Note: Intention to treat pooling the three smaller cash transfer amounts into a single arm, GD Main. Regressions include but do not report the lagged dependent variable, fixed
effects for randomization blocks, and a set of LASSO-selected baseline covariates, and are weighted to reflect intensive tracking. Standard errors are (in soft brackets) are clustered at
the household level to reflect the design effect, and p-values corrected for False Discovery Rates across all the outcomes in the table are presented in hard brackets. Stars on coefficient
estimates are derived from the FDR-corrected p-values, *=10%, **=5%, and ***=1% significance. p-values in final three columns derived from F -tests of hypotheses that benefit-cost
ratios are equal between (a) GD Main and HD; (b) GD Main and GD Large; and (c) GD Main and Combined. Employed is a dummy variable for spending more than 10 hours per
week working for a wage or as primary operator of a microenterprise. Productive hours are measured over prior 7 days in all activities other than own-farm agriculture. Monthly
income, productive assets, and household consumption are winsorized at 1% and 99% and analyzed in Inverse Hyperbolic Sine, meaning that treatment effects can be interpreted as
percent changes.
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Table A.6: Intent-to-treat analysis: Secondary outcomes, aggregated specification
GiveDirectly Control p-values
HD Main Large Combined Mean Obs. R2 (a) (b) (c)
Panel A. Beneficiary welfare
Subjective well-being 0.19∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.00 1770 0.13 0.03 0.03 0.00
(0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Mental health −0.04 0.01 0.11 0.12 0.00 1770 0.07 0.43 0.48 0.40
(0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.09)
[0.34] [0.34] [0.16] [0.12]
Beneficiary-specific
consumption
0.15 0.58∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 8.27 1770 0.23 0.01 0.00 0.02
(0.11) (0.10) (0.15) (0.12)
[0.12] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Panel B. Household wealth
HH net non-land wealth −0.17 0.91∗∗∗ 1.11∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗ 11.28 1770 0.20 0.02 0.41 0.28
(0.40) (0.35) (0.41) (0.48)
[0.31] [0.01] [0.01] [0.05]
HH livestock wealth −0.00 2.08∗∗∗ 2.17∗∗∗ 2.22∗∗∗ 7.81 1770 0.25 0.00 0.02 0.02
(0.37) (0.35) (0.47) (0.45)
[0.46] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Savings 1.04∗∗∗ 1.30∗∗∗ 1.43∗∗∗ 1.70∗∗∗ 9.24 1770 0.20 0.40 0.04 0.15
(0.23) (0.23) (0.31) (0.27)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Debt 0.40 −0.29 −0.37 0.00 8.75 1770 0.20 0.02 0.80 0.34
(0.28) (0.30) (0.42) (0.38)
[0.10] [0.19] [0.22] [0.46]
Panel C. Beneficiary cognitive and non-cognitive skills
Locus of control 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.23∗∗ 0.00 1770 0.27 0.58 0.98 0.14
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08)
[0.45] [0.53] [0.45] [0.02]
Aspirations −0.01 0.05 0.03 0.14 0.00 1770 0.08 0.52 0.60 0.63
(0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08)
[1.00] [0.54] [1.00] [0.20]
Big Five index 0.12 0.07 −0.08 0.02 0.00 1770 0.10 0.23 0.10 0.40
(0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09)
[0.20] [0.45] [0.53] [1.00]
Business knowledge 0.65∗∗∗ 0.08 −0.03 0.63∗∗∗ 0.00 1770 0.23 0.00 0.19 0.00
(0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09)
[0.00] [0.45] [1.00] [0.00]
Business attitudes 0.12 0.16∗ 0.06 0.15 0.00 1770 0.09 0.81 0.06 0.26
(0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09)
[0.20] [0.06] [0.65] [0.20]
Notes: Regressions include but do not report the lagged dependent variable, fixed effects for randomization blocks, and a set of LASSO-selected baseline covariates, and are weighted
to reflect intensive tracking. Standard errors are (in soft brackets) are clustered at the household level to reflect the design effect, and p-values corrected for False Discovery Rates across
all the outcomes in the table are presented in hard brackets. Stars on coefficient estimates are derived from the FDR-corrected p-values, *=10%, **=5%, and ***=1% significance.
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Table A.7: Breakdown of employment impacts
GiveDirectly Control
HD Lower Middle Upper Large Combined Mean Obs. R2 p-value
Panel A. Employment composition
Non-agricultural microenterprise 0.05 0.09∗ 0.08∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.22 1770 0.12 0.00
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
[0.11] [0.06] [0.08] [0.02] [0.00] [0.02]
Other microenterprise or
self-employment
0.04∗ 0.04 0.11∗∗ 0.07∗ 0.05∗ 0.04 0.07 1770 0.09 0.02
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
[0.06] [0.11] [0.02] [0.06] [0.09] [0.11]
Agricultural processing or trading 0.01 0.13∗∗ 0.01 0.07∗ 0.06 0.02 0.17 1770 0.08 0.05
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
[0.24] [0.02] [0.24] [0.08] [0.11] [0.24]
Agricultural wage labor −0.02 −0.08∗∗ −0.07∗ −0.08∗∗ −0.11∗∗ −0.09∗∗ 0.22 1770 0.15 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
[0.24] [0.03] [0.06] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03]
Non-agricultural wage labor 0.06∗ −0.04 0.01 −0.06 −0.07∗ 0.01 0.30 1770 0.20 0.00
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
[0.06] [0.16] [0.24] [0.11] [0.09] [0.24]
Panel B. Alternative hours thresholds
Employed (0 hr) 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.70 1770 0.12 0.46
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
Employed (10 hr) 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.48 1770 0.16 0.95
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
Employed (20 hr) 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.29 1770 0.17 0.62
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
Employed (30 hr) 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.19 1770 0.17 0.37
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
Employed (40 hr) 0.03 0.03 0.09 −0.01 0.02 0.04 0.13 1770 0.17 0.26
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
[1.00] [1.00] [0.70] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
Notes: Panel A presents impacts on indicators for employment of any hours in the corresponding activity type in the preceding week. Panel B presents impacts on an indicator for
overall employment, using the reported threshold for minimum hours. Regressions include but do not report an indicator for lagged employment status, fixed effects for randomization
blocks, and a set of LASSO-selected baseline covariates, and are weighted to reflect intensive tracking. Standard errors are (in soft brackets) are clustered at the household level to
reflect the design effect, and p-values corrected for False Discovery Rates across outcomes in each panel are presented in hard brackets. Stars on coefficient estimates are derived from
the FDR-corrected p-values, *=10%, **=5%, and ***=1% significance.
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Table A.8: Heterogeneity: Gender
Employed
Productive
Hours
Monthly
Income
Productive
Assets Consumption
HD 0.09 1.43 0.14 1.03 0.01
(0.05) (2.78) (0.37) (0.61) (0.10)
[0.30] [0.96] [0.96] [0.30] [1.00]
GD main 0.05 4.44 0.79∗ 2.97∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗
(0.05) (2.98) (0.33) (0.59) (0.10)
[0.71] [0.41] [0.06] [0.00] [0.02]
GD large 0.04 −0.08 0.62 3.18∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗
(0.07) (3.62) (0.51) (0.77) (0.12)
[0.88] [1.00] [0.52] [0.00] [0.01]
Combined 0.05 3.55 0.59 3.50∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗
(0.06) (3.67) (0.43) (0.71) (0.13)
[0.75] [0.71] [0.44] [0.00] [0.02]
HD × Female −0.12 2.16 0.02 0.32 0.11
(0.07) (3.35) (0.50) (0.75) (0.13)
[0.30] [0.88] [1.00] [0.96] [0.71]
GD main × Female −0.05 −0.32 −0.07 1.17 −0.06
(0.07) (3.53) (0.48) (0.73) (0.12)
[0.75] [1.00] [1.00] [0.33] [0.96]
GD large × Female −0.04 1.95 0.28 1.02 −0.01
(0.09) (4.29) (0.68) (0.99) (0.15)
[0.96] [0.96] [0.96] [0.70] [1.00]
Combined × Female −0.08 −2.65 0.61 1.25 −0.21
(0.09) (4.30) (0.60) (0.89) (0.16)
[0.71] [0.88] [0.70] [0.44] [0.49]
Female −0.16∗∗∗ −13.87∗∗∗ −1.80∗∗∗ −1.32∗ 0.03
(0.05) (2.26) (0.35) (0.53) (0.09)
[0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.05] [0.96]
Control mean 0.48 18.64 8.05 5.61 9.46
Observations 1770 1770 1770 1770 1737
R2 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.10
p-value 0.53 0.84 0.81 0.43 0.38
Notes: Table presents tests for heterogeneity of treatment effects by Gender. Uninteracted coefficients in the first
four rows give the treatment effect of the program on men, and the next four rows test for the differential effect
between women and men. Standard errors are (in soft brackets) are clustered at the household level to reflect the
design effect, and p-values corrected for False Discovery Rates across all the outcomes in the table are presented
in hard brackets. Stars on coefficient estimates are derived from the FDR-corrected p-values, *=10%, **=5%, and
***=1% significance. p-value in the last row from an F-test on whether treatments have a jointly differential effect
by gender.
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Table A.9: Heterogeneity: Risk aversion
Employed
Productive
Hours
Monthly
Income
Productive
Assets Consumption
HD 0.01 2.64 0.12 1.21∗∗∗ 0.08
(0.03) (1.62) (0.27) (0.37) (0.06)
[0.84] [0.23] [0.84] [0.01] [0.40]
GD main 0.01 4.25∗∗ 0.74∗∗ 3.68∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗
(0.03) (1.70) (0.26) (0.36) (0.06)
[0.84] [0.05] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00]
GD large 0.02 0.78 0.74 3.83∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗
(0.05) (2.10) (0.37) (0.49) (0.08)
[0.84] [0.84] [0.13] [0.00] [0.00]
Combined 0.01 2.66 1.01∗∗∗ 4.26∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
(0.04) (2.11) (0.31) (0.43) (0.08)
[0.84] [0.38] [0.01] [0.00] [0.01]
HD × Baseline risk
aversion
0.03 1.68 0.50 −0.11 0.04
(0.03) (1.61) (0.26) (0.37) (0.06)
[0.67] [0.50] [0.15] [0.84] [0.84]
GD main × Baseline
risk aversion
0.01 −0.51 0.34 −0.06 0.00
(0.03) (1.71) (0.25) (0.35) (0.06)
[0.84] [0.84] [0.38] [0.84] [0.94]
GD large × Baseline
risk aversion
0.05 1.96 0.55 −0.68 −0.01
(0.05) (2.07) (0.37) (0.49) (0.08)
[0.40] [0.56] [0.30] [0.36] [0.84]
Combined × Baseline
risk aversion
0.07 3.75 0.75∗ 0.12 −0.03
(0.04) (2.07) (0.31) (0.43) (0.08)
[0.23] [0.18] [0.05] [0.84] [0.84]
Baseline risk aversion −0.01 −0.38 −0.43∗ 0.10 −0.05
(0.02) (1.10) (0.19) (0.26) (0.04)
[0.84] [0.84] [0.06] [0.84] [0.50]
Control mean 0.48 18.64 8.05 5.61 9.46
Observations 1770 1770 1770 1770 1737
R2 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.10
p-value 0.42 0.27 0.13 0.65 0.95
Notes: Table presents tests for heterogeneity of treatment effects by Risk Aversion. Risk Aversion demeaned before
interaction so first four rows give effect of treatment at average value, and next four rows test for differential treatment
effect by risk aversion. Standard errors are (in soft brackets) are clustered at the household level to reflect the design
effect, and p-values corrected for False Discovery Rates across all the outcomes in the table are presented in hard
brackets. Stars on coefficient estimates are derived from the FDR-corrected p-values, *=10%, **=5%, and ***=1%
significance. p-value in the last row from an F-test on whether treatments have a jointly differential effect by gender.
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Table A.10: Heterogeneity: Baseline household consumption
Employed
Productive
Hours
Monthly
Income
Productive
Assets Consumption
HD 0.01 2.60 0.14 1.27∗∗∗ 0.13∗
(0.03) (1.62) (0.27) (0.37) (0.06)
[0.64] [0.18] [0.63] [0.00] [0.09]
GD main 0.02 4.31∗∗ 0.76∗∗ 3.72∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗
(0.03) (1.70) (0.26) (0.36) (0.06)
[0.63] [0.04] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00]
GD large 0.03 1.17 0.84∗ 3.93∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗
(0.05) (2.08) (0.36) (0.48) (0.08)
[0.63] [0.63] [0.06] [0.00] [0.00]
Combined 0.02 2.90 1.08∗∗∗ 4.32∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
(0.04) (2.14) (0.30) (0.42) (0.08)
[0.64] [0.27] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
HD × Baseline HH
consumption per AE
−0.04 −1.09 0.03 −0.19 −0.02
(0.03) (1.72) (0.25) (0.38) (0.07)
[0.31] [0.63] [0.80] [0.63] [0.64]
GD main × Baseline
HH consumption per
AE
0.01 0.83 0.29 −0.07 −0.11
(0.03) (1.63) (0.27) (0.34) (0.06)
[0.64] [0.63] [0.37] [0.76] [0.13]
GD large × Baseline
HH consumption per
AE
0.09∗ 2.51 0.70 0.46 −0.13
(0.04) (1.95) (0.39) (0.48) (0.08)
[0.09] [0.29] [0.14] [0.45] [0.18]
Combined × Baseline
HH consumption per
AE
−0.02 −1.44 −0.69∗ −0.68 0.00
(0.04) (2.15) (0.30) (0.41) (0.11)
[0.63] [0.63] [0.06] [0.17] [0.82]
Baseline HH
consumption per AE
0.02 0.43 0.10 0.51 0.32∗∗∗
(0.02) (1.05) (0.18) (0.27) (0.04)
[0.63] [0.64] [0.63] [0.12] [0.00]
Control mean 0.48 18.64 8.05 5.61 9.46
Observations 1770 1770 1770 1770 1737
R2 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.12 0.18
p-value 0.05 0.43 0.01 0.21 0.24
Notes: Table presents tests for heterogeneity of treatment effects by baseline Household Consumption. Consumption
demeaned before interaction so first four rows give effect of treatment at average value, and next four rows test for
differential treatment effect by consumption. Standard errors are (in soft brackets) are clustered at the household
level to reflect the design effect, and p-values corrected for False Discovery Rates across all the outcomes in the
table are presented in hard brackets. Stars on coefficient estimates are derived from the FDR-corrected p-values,
*=10%, **=5%, and ***=1% significance. p-value in the last row from an F-test on whether treatments have a
jointly differential effect by gender.
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Table A.11: Heterogeneity: Baseline local employment rates
Employed
Productive
Hours
Monthly
Income
Productive
Assets Consumption
HD 0.01 2.53 0.10 1.21∗∗∗ 0.08
(0.03) (1.61) (0.27) (0.37) (0.06)
[1.00] [0.37] [1.00] [0.01] [0.60]
GD main 0.01 4.29∗∗ 0.73∗∗ 3.68∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗
(0.03) (1.71) (0.26) (0.36) (0.06)
[1.00] [0.05] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00]
GD large 0.02 0.83 0.77 3.84∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗
(0.05) (2.11) (0.37) (0.49) (0.08)
[1.00] [1.00] [0.13] [0.00] [0.00]
Combined 0.02 2.80 1.04∗∗∗ 4.30∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
(0.04) (2.13) (0.31) (0.42) (0.08)
[1.00] [0.60] [0.01] [0.00] [0.01]
HD × Baseline cell
share employed
0.35 19.81 2.94 4.69 0.15
(0.32) (16.21) (2.56) (3.64) (0.62)
[0.60] [0.60] [0.60] [0.60] [1.00]
GD main × Baseline
cell share employed
0.17 −1.97 3.00 1.72 0.26
(0.32) (17.05) (2.47) (3.50) (0.59)
[1.00] [1.00] [0.60] [1.00] [1.00]
GD large × Baseline
cell share employed
0.34 0.26 2.38 5.25 −0.88
(0.46) (22.84) (3.23) (4.42) (0.79)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [0.60] [0.60]
Combined × Baseline
cell share employed
0.27 −1.71 2.68 7.59 1.51
(0.43) (21.35) (3.11) (4.23) (0.76)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [0.23] [0.16]
Baseline cell share
employed
0.04 0.29 1.02 −1.41 −0.24
(0.25) (12.35) (1.98) (2.87) (0.50)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
Control mean 0.48 18.64 8.05 5.61 9.46
Observations 1770 1770 1770 1770 1737
R2 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.10
p-value 0.85 0.65 0.77 0.35 0.10
Notes: Table presents tests for heterogeneity of treatment effects by baseline Employment Rates. Employment
demeaned before interaction so first four rows give effect of treatment at average value, and next four rows test
for differential treatment effect by employment rates. Standard errors are (in soft brackets) are clustered at the
household level to reflect the design effect, and p-values corrected for False Discovery Rates across all the outcomes in
the table are presented in hard brackets. Stars on coefficient estimates are derived from the FDR-corrected p-values,
*=10%, **=5%, and ***=1% significance. p-value in the last row from an F-test on whether treatments have a
jointly differential effect by gender.
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Table A.12: Heterogeneity: Age 23 and over
Employed
Productive
Hours
Monthly
Income
Productive
Assets Consumption
HD 0.06 4.32 0.26 1.17 0.09
(0.05) (2.52) (0.43) (0.56) (0.10)
[0.64] [0.32] [1.00] [0.15] [0.82]
GD main 0.02 2.39 0.72 4.26∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗
(0.05) (2.46) (0.42) (0.53) (0.09)
[1.00] [0.82] [0.32] [0.00] [0.02]
GD large 0.00 0.03 0.88 4.27∗∗∗ 0.31∗
(0.07) (3.23) (0.62) (0.76) (0.12)
[1.00] [1.00] [0.47] [0.00] [0.05]
Combined 0.08 2.02 1.53∗∗ 3.97∗∗∗ 0.21
(0.06) (2.98) (0.47) (0.63) (0.11)
[0.64] [1.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.30]
HD × Older than 22 −0.08 −3.01 −0.23 0.08 −0.01
(0.07) (3.25) (0.55) (0.74) (0.12)
[0.64] [0.82] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
GD main × Older
than 22
0.00 3.64 0.12 −1.06 −0.05
(0.07) (3.41) (0.53) (0.72) (0.12)
[1.00] [0.71] [1.00] [0.47] [1.00]
GD large × Older than
22
0.01 1.04 −0.29 −0.76 0.04
(0.10) (4.23) (0.74) (0.99) (0.15)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [0.97] [1.00]
Combined × Older
than 22
−0.11 1.55 −0.88 0.57 0.10
(0.09) (4.19) (0.63) (0.86) (0.16)
[0.64] [1.00] [0.47] [1.00] [1.00]
Older than 22 0.12∗ 2.47 1.04∗ 0.28 0.22∗
(0.05) (2.18) (0.39) (0.53) (0.09)
[0.06] [0.64] [0.05] [1.00] [0.06]
Control mean 0.48 18.64 8.05 5.61 9.46
Observations 1770 1770 1770 1770 1737
R2 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.11
p-value 0.51 0.46 0.57 0.26 0.90
Notes: Table presents tests for heterogeneity of treatment effects by age. First four rows give effect of treatment
among young, and next four rows test for differential treatment effect for those 23 and over. Standard errors are
(in soft brackets) are clustered at the household level to reflect the design effect, and p-values corrected for False
Discovery Rates across all the outcomes in the table are presented in hard brackets. Stars on coefficient estimates are
derived from the FDR-corrected p-values, *=10%, **=5%, and ***=1% significance. p-value in the last row from an
F-test on whether treatments have a jointly differential effect by gender.
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Table A.13: Spillover effects: full model, employment outcome
Treatment
HD GD Main GD Huge
Direct effects of treatment at saturation level of zero
Direct effect −0.02 −0.02 0.05
(0.07) (0.07) (0.13)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
Spillover effects of treatment onto control individuals
Spillover to control −0.01 −0.09 0.06
(0.09) (0.09) (0.16)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
Additional effect of treatment onto individuals assigned to. . .
HD 0.00 0.10 −0.10
(0.11) (0.11) (0.19)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
GD main 0.02 0.15 −0.28
(0.11) (0.12) (0.20)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
GD large 0.03 −0.08 −0.23
(0.22) (0.17) (0.42)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
Saturation mean 0.36 0.36 0.09
Saturation SD 0.23 0.23 0.13
p-value 1.00 0.55 0.49
Notes: Each column describes the direct and spillover effects of a specific treatment on Employment; all results in
the table are from a single estimation. Saturation mean and standard deviation correspond to the distribution of
saturation rates for the treatment in question. Regressions include but do not report the lagged dependent variable,
fixed effects for randomization blocks, and a set of LASSO-selected baseline covariates, and are weighted to reflect
intensive tracking. Standard errors are (in soft brackets) are clustered at the household level to reflect the design
effect, and p-values corrected for False Discovery Rates across all the outcomes in the table are presented in hard
brackets. Stars on coefficient estimates are derived from the FDR-corrected p-values, *=10%, **=5%, and ***=1%
significance. p-value in the last row corresponds to a test for whether the treatment in question has interference
effects on any arm, including control.
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Table A.14: Spillover effects: full model, productive hours outcome
Treatment
HD GD Main GD Huge
Direct effects of treatment at saturation level of zero
Direct effect 2.26 5.60 9.52
(3.71) (3.67) (6.27)
[1.00] [0.76] [0.76]
Spillover effects of treatment onto control individuals
Spillover to control 0.81 1.74 −0.12
(4.39) (4.68) (6.56)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
Additional effect of treatment onto individuals assigned to. . .
HD 0.81 −2.50 −8.79
(5.72) (5.82) (9.63)
[1.00] [1.00] [0.87]
GD main −7.55 2.76 −12.81
(5.60) (6.39) (8.73)
[0.76] [1.00] [0.76]
GD large −5.79 −11.98 −31.75
(10.27) (7.70) (17.74)
[1.00] [0.76] [0.76]
Saturation mean 0.36 0.36 0.09
Saturation SD 0.23 0.23 0.13
p-value 0.65 0.49 0.09
Notes: Each column describes the direct and spillover effects of a specific treatment on Productive Hours; all results
in the table are from a single estimation. Saturation mean and standard deviation correspond to the distribution of
saturation rates for the treatment in question. Regressions include but do not report the lagged dependent variable,
fixed effects for randomization blocks, and a set of LASSO-selected baseline covariates, and are weighted to reflect
intensive tracking. Standard errors are (in soft brackets) are clustered at the household level to reflect the design
effect, and p-values corrected for False Discovery Rates across all the outcomes in the table are presented in hard
brackets. Stars on coefficient estimates are derived from the FDR-corrected p-values, *=10%, **=5%, and ***=1%
significance. p-value in the last corresponds to a test for whether the treatment in question has interference effects
on any arm, including control.
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Table A.15: Spillover effects: full model, monthly income outcome
Treatment
HD GD Main GD Huge
Direct effects of treatment at saturation level of zero
Direct effect 0.23 0.96 1.77
(0.55) (0.58) (0.88)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
Spillover effects of treatment onto control individuals
Spillover to control 0.48 −0.69 0.53
(0.82) (0.79) (1.13)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
Additional effect of treatment onto individuals assigned to. . .
HD −0.92 0.91 0.05
(0.87) (0.82) (1.57)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
GD main −0.28 0.39 −1.10
(0.91) (0.92) (1.40)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
GD large −1.61 −1.75 2.08
(1.41) (1.40) (3.37)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
Saturation mean 0.36 0.36 0.09
Saturation SD 0.23 0.23 0.13
p-value 0.66 0.28 0.88
Notes: Each column describes the direct and spillover effects of a specific treatment on Monthly Income (IHS);
all results in the table are from a single estimation. Saturation mean and standard deviation correspond to the
distribution of saturation rates for the treatment in question. Regressions include but do not report the lagged
dependent variable, fixed effects for randomization blocks, and a set of LASSO-selected baseline covariates, and are
weighted to reflect intensive tracking. Standard errors are (in soft brackets) are clustered at the household level
to reflect the design effect, and p-values corrected for False Discovery Rates across all the outcomes in the table
are presented in hard brackets. Stars on coefficient estimates are derived from the FDR-corrected p-values, *=10%,
**=5%, and ***=1% significance. p-value in the last row corresponds to a test for whether the treatment in question
has interference effects on any arm, including control.
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Table A.16: Spillover effects: productive assets outcome
Treatment
HD GD Main GD Huge
Direct effects of treatment at saturation level of zero
Direct effect 2.34∗∗∗ 4.35∗∗∗ 5.64∗∗∗
(0.74) (0.73) (1.09)
[0.01] [0.00] [0.00]
Spillover effects of treatment onto control individuals
Spillover to control 1.05 1.69 2.18
(1.00) (1.10) (1.72)
[0.36] [0.26] [0.34]
Additional effect of treatment onto individuals assigned to. . .
HD −0.61 −1.95 −2.85
(1.32) (1.17) (2.10)
[0.49] [0.26] [0.32]
GD main −2.17 0.23 −1.82
(1.34) (1.11) (1.88)
[0.26] [0.52] [0.36]
GD large −0.88 −2.22 −7.88
(1.90) (1.87) (4.10)
[0.49] [0.35] [0.20]
Saturation mean 0.36 0.36 0.09
Saturation SD 0.23 0.23 0.13
p-value 0.62 0.21 0.27
Notes: Each column describes the direct and spillover effects of a specific treatment on Productive Assets (IHS);
all results in the table are from a single estimation. Saturation mean and standard deviation correspond to the
distribution of saturation rates for the treatment in question. Regressions include but do not report the lagged
dependent variable, fixed effects for randomization blocks, and a set of LASSO-selected baseline covariates, and are
weighted to reflect intensive tracking. Standard errors are (in soft brackets) are clustered at the household level
to reflect the design effect, and p-values corrected for False Discovery Rates across all the outcomes in the table
are presented in hard brackets. Stars on coefficient estimates are derived from the FDR-corrected p-values, *=10%,
**=5%, and ***=1% significance. p-value in the last row corresponds to a test for whether the treatment in question
has interference effects on any arm, including control.
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Table A.17: Spillover effects: consumption
Treatment
HD GD Main GD Huge
Direct effects of treatment at saturation level of zero
Direct effect 0.01 0.29 0.20
(0.12) (0.11) (0.20)
[1.00] [0.23] [1.00]
Spillover effects of treatment onto control individuals
Spillover to control 0.05 0.02 −0.36
(0.16) (0.18) (0.25)
[1.00] [1.00] [0.75]
Additional effect of treatment onto individuals assigned to. . .
HD 0.16 −0.05 −0.01
(0.20) (0.19) (0.32)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
GD main −0.21 −0.08 0.53
(0.17) (0.19) (0.28)
[1.00] [1.00] [0.40]
GD large −0.04 0.18 1.22
(0.33) (0.30) (0.59)
[1.00] [1.00] [0.37]
Saturation mean 0.36 0.36 0.09
Saturation SD 0.23 0.23 0.13
p-value 0.68 0.90 0.11
Notes: Each column describes the direct and spillover effects of a specific treatment on Household Consumption
(IHS); all results in the table are from a single estimation. Saturation mean and standard deviation correspond to the
distribution of saturation rates for the treatment in question. Standard errors are (in soft brackets) are clustered at the
household level to reflect the design effect, and p-values corrected for False Discovery Rates across all the outcomes in
the table are presented in hard brackets. Stars on coefficient estimates are derived from the FDR-corrected p-values,
*=10%, **=5%, and ***=1% significance. p-value in the last row corresponds to a test for whether the treatment in
question has interference effects on any arm, including control.
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Figure B.1: Project timeline
2017
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2019
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Figure B.2: CDF of Savings Stocks (IHS)
Figure B.3: CDF of Productive Hours
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Figure B.4: Non-Ag Wage Employment, varying hours thresholds
Figure B.5: Non-Ag Self Employment, varying hours thresholds
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Figure B.6: Ag Wage Employment, varying hours thresholds
Figure B.7: Ag Self Employment, varying hours thresholds
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Figure B.8: Ag processing or trading Employment, varying hours thresholds
Figure B.9: Rolling Phone Survey: Monthly impacts on Productive Hours
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Figure B.10: Rolling Phone Survey: Monthly impacts on Apprenticeship Hours
Figure B.11: Cost Equivalence on Secondary Outcomes
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Figure B.12: Village-Level Treatment Saturations
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Appendix C Selection of control variables
In our pre-analysis plan, we state that control variables for the primary specification “will be
selected on the basis of their ability to predict the primary outcomes”. In doing so, we seek to
build on recent developments that balance the challenge of using baseline data to select variables
that will reduce residual variance in equation (1) with the danger that researcher freedom in the
selection of control variables can lead to p-hacking, in which right-hand-side variables are selected
specifically on the basis of the statistical significance of the coefficient of interest (Card and Krueger,
1995; Casey et al., 2012), thereby invalidating inference.
To balance these concerns, we adapt the post-double-selection approach set forth in Belloni et
al. (2014b, henceforth BCH). BCH advocate a two-step procedure in which, first, Lasso is used to
automate the selection of control variables, and second, the post-Lasso estimator (Belloni et al.,
2012) is used to estimate the coefficients of primary interest in Equation (1), effectively using Lasso
as a model selection device but not imposing the shrunken coefficients that results from the Lasso
estimates directly. Belloni et al. (2014b) demonstrate that this approach not only reduces bias in
estimated treatment effects better than alternative approaches—less a concern given the successful
randomization in our experiment—but that it may improve power while retaining uniformly valid
inference.
In the first stage, model selection is undertaken by retaining control variables from the union
of those chosen either as predictive of the treatment assignment or of the outcome. This model
selection stage can be undertaken after residualizing to account for a set of control variables that
the authors have a priori determined below in the model, as in Belloni et al. (2014a). In our case, we
retain block fixed effects, lagged values of the outcome, and lagged values of (the inverse hyperbolic
sine of) household wealth in all specifications, per our pre-analysis plan.
We modify the BCH approach for application to a randomized experiment in three ways. First,
again following (Jones et al., 2019), for each outcome we choose the Lasso penalty parameter that
minimizes the 10-fold cross-validated mean squared error. Second, to ensure that chance differences
in the leverage of observations across different covariate sets do not lead to different conclusions
about the (relative) impacts of treatment across different outcomes (Young, 2019), we take the
union of covariate sets selected to be predictive of the five primary outcomes of the study, and
use these as controls for all outcomes. And third, we modify the heteroskedasticity-robust Lasso
estimator of Belloni et al. (2012) to incorporate sampling weights consistent with our design.22
The set of potential covariates is determined as follows:
• Baseline values of all primary outcomes, including the individual components of the employ-
ment status, productive time use, monthly income variables outlined in Section 2.7;
• Baseline values of all secondary outcomes,
• Baseline values of all dimensions of heterogeneity pre-specified in Section 3.4.
22Specifically, we up-weight observations in our ‘intensive tracking’ endline sample by the inverse of the fraction of
not-initially-reached individuals in the follow-up survey who were then assigned to intensive tracking.
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• The number of study participants (in any arm of the study) in an individual’s village, which
is defined as the measure of network ‘degree’ for each individual in the spillover analysis of
Section 3.5.
All variables are normalized prior to inclusion in the selection routine, to have mean zero and
variance of one in the baseline sample. We include squares of all continuous variables and all
pairwise interactions among the potential covariates above, and between the potential covariates
above and the set of variables that force the routine to include without penalty To ensure that
sample size is not affected by the choice of covariates, we impute values of zero for all variables
in the potential covariate list, and for each potential covariate we include an indicator for whether
such an imputation was undertaken among the list of potential covariates to be fed into the BCH
first-stage selection procedure.
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Appendix D Administrative information
Appendix D.1 Funding
All research funding for this project was provided by USAID.
Appendix D.2 Details of Study Participant Selection
To meet the Huguka Dukore eligiblity criteria, participating youth must meet the following criteria:
• 6-12 years of basic education (inclusive).
• Age 16-30 at enrollment.
• Drawn from Ubudehe poverty groups 1 and 2, per GiveDirectly’s remit from the Rwandan
Government to treat only the poorest households with cash transfers.
Additionally, HD in its outreach specifically targeted the following criteria for inclusion, meaning
that such youth will be specially recruited to participate:
• Out of school for three consecutive years
• Income of less than $1.75 per day
• Youth exhibiting some form of disability (that can be accommodated in HD programming)
• Women.
• Youth who have not benefited from related interventions in the past.
Hard eligibility criteria and targeted characteristics were provided to local government leaders,
who provided lists of potential candidates to EDC. Those candidates were then invited to the
information session and formally screened for eligibility.
All listing and determination of eligibility were conducted by EDC via an over-subscription
process. Under this protocol, EDC enrolled more eligible individuals than they were able to treat
with HD, in order to generate the samples for the alternate (household grants) arm and the control.
In the end we recruited 1848 study youth from approximately 250 villages in our 13 sectors, for an
average of roughly 7.4 study individuals per village.
Below, we characterize the process for (over)subscription, which delivered the sample of indi-
viduals for the baseline.
1. Sector-level meeting to discuss HD with local leaders that introduced the study. In this
meeting, sector officials were fully informed about the scope of the study, emphasizing the
separateness of the two interventions and implementers.
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2. Announcement to the community in public places (churches, community halls) or a
meeting to engage potential beneficiaries. At this point only the HD program wsa described
to beneficiaries, and with only general language about the household grants arm. Guiding
language: “We are pleased to be able to bring programming to this community that seeks
to improve the livelihoods of vulnerable youth. To this end, we are requesting the names
and contact details of youth meeting the following criteria: ¡insert eligibility criteria here¿.
Participating youth should be willing and interested to join an employment skills program,
called HD, that will provide training and work experience to participants.”
3. Screening of youth by the selection committee which produced the final list of potential
beneficiaries that was passed to local implementing partners (IPs).
4. Invitation of potential beneficiaries to an orientation meeting. The language of this
invitation reflected the fact that potential beneficiaries were not guaranteed places in HD,
and might be randomly allocated to a different program or the control. Guiding language
for official communication: “We have determined that you are eligible for the Huguka Dukore
program. There may be more eligible individuals than Huguka Dukore will treat this year, so
you are not yet guaranteed a place, though some of those not treated by Huguka Dukore will
be supported by another NGO. To find out more about the Huguka Dukore program and to
take the next step toward this opportunity, please attend an orientation meeting at XXX on
YYY date.”
5. Orientation and awareness meeting with selected youth by local IPs at which they
are given further explanation about the program. In HDs other districts, these orientation
meetings convey information about the scope of that program, under a presumption that
those who participate in the orientation meeting can have a place in HD should they choose
to take it up.
6. Description of the lottery for program assignment. The lottery is described during
this meeting with reference to another intervention providing livelihoods assistance that will
also be determined by the lottery. Guiding language: Today you have learned more about
the Huguka Dukore program. This is one of two programs that are being delivered by dis-
tinct NGOs, in coordination with Sector and District officials, both of which seek to improve
livelihoods for vulnerable youth. If you decide that you are interested in participating in one
of these programs, there is one more step in the selection process. To participate, you must
attest that you have the time and interest required to participate in Huguka Dukore. Your
name will then be entered into a pool of applicants. There will be a public meeting in which a
lottery will be used to determine which of these applicants receives a place in HD. You may
attend this meeting if you wish, but you do not have to do so in order to gain a place. Not all
whose names are entered into the lottery will be placed in HD. Some of those who participate
in the lottery will be passed to a second NGO, which provides assistance to individuals seeking
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to improve their livelihoods. Those who receive a place in either program will be contacted
directly by the relevant organization after the lottery. To gain access to either program, you
must participate in this lottery. If you are willing to participate, please provide your name
and contact details in writing. Prior to the lottery, you may be contacted by an independent
research organization called Innovations for Poverty Action, who are conducting a survey of
potential beneficiaries. You do not have to participate in this survey in order to gain access
to our program, and participation will not affect your chances of enrollment. However, we
would be grateful for your willingness to participate in an interview with IPA, which will help
us to understand the design and impacts of our work.
7. Registration for the lottery assignment. To correctly reflect the lottery process to par-
ticipants, they were told when asked to enroll in the study that it is a lottery in which you
will have a chance of receiving HD, a chance of receiving assistance from a different organi-
zation that gives household grants, and a chance that you do not receive either program.”
Individuals who do not choose to register for the study will not be excluded from receiving
HD if they are eligible & choose to participate.
Appendix D.2.1 Defining Primary outcomes
For each of the outcomes defined below, we provide a definition, followed by an explanation of how
that measure will be constructed from survey data. Survey questions either begin with a ‘B-’ for
the beneficiary instrument or a ‘H-’ for the household instrument, followed by the two-digit section
number, followed by ‘q’ and the question number. These refer to the beneficiary and household
instruments, respectively.23
There are five primary outcomes:
1. Employment status. A binary indicator variable taking a value of one if the beneficiary
spent 10 hours or more in the prior week working in a wage job or as primary operator of a
microenterprise. The 1 week recall is per ILO definition. Defined as ’Yes’ if beneficiary spent
10 hours or more on any of the following activities:
• Processing or trading of agricultural goods (B02qagroprocesshrs)
• Agricultural (off farm) wage labor (B02qfarmhours)
• Non-agricultural wage labor (B02qnoagrichrs)
• Non-agricultural microenterprise (B02qenterphrs)
• Microenterprise or other self employment (B02qsemployhrs).
2. Off-own-farm productive time use. Defined as the number of productive hours over the past
7 days. Sum of hours from questions:
23In the electronic survey instrument, all variables begin with an ‘m’ prefix, but this notation does not guarantee
uniqueness across instruments. Consequently for the purposes of this PAP we adopt the ‘B-’ and ‘H-’ convention
above.
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• Processing or trading of agricultural goods (B02qagroprocesshrs)
• Agricultural (off farm) wage labor (B02qfarmhours)
• Non-agricultural wage labor (B02qnoagrichrs)
• Non-agricultural microenterprise (B02qenterphrs)
• Microenterprise or other self employment (B02qsemployhrs)
• Apprenticeship (B02qapprenticehrs)
3. Beneficiary’s (monthly) income. Defined as the sum of the following monthly recall questions:
• Agricultural own-farm income (B02qagricearn)
• Agricultural wage income (B02qfarmwage)
• Non-agricultural wage income (B02qnoagricwage)
• Microenterprise profits (B02qenterpwage + B02qsemploywage);
• Livestock rearing income (B02qlivestockwage)
• Agricultural processing and trading income (B02qagroprocessearn)
• Apprenticeship income (B02qapprenticewage)
This outcome will be winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile, and we will take the inverse
hyperbolic sine transformation of this as the primary measure.
4. Productive assets under beneficiary control. (Sum of asset values from beneficiary enterprise
module that are reported as used in the beneficiary’s business, Section B05: tools, machinery,
furniture, inventories, and other physical assets.) This outcome will be winsorized at the 1st
and 99th percentile, and we will take the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of this as the
primary measure.
5. Household consumption per capita. Sum of monthly purchase values of Section H10, divided
by adult-equivalent household members. This outcome will be winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentile, and we will take the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of this as the primary
measure.
The first three of these primary outcomes provide direct measures of the extent to which a study
participant is productively employed: their formal (non-farm) employment categorization, their
productive time use, and their earnings. To the extent that these measures are potentially seasonal
in nature, one might worry that interventions could differentially affect the sectoral composition of
employment, and that differential seasonality across these would tip the scales in favor of one or the
other mode of intervention. More broadly, income may be more fully measured in one sector relative
to another. Such concerns are partly addressed by the inclusion of household consumption as a
primary outcome: to the extent that beneficiaries smooth consumption, household consumption
will be less susceptible to such concerns. In addition, we will include as a robustness check an
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analysis of impacts on a rolling panel of employment status measures, collected over the six months
prior to the endline.
One potential challenge for the analysis of monetary outcomes (income, assets, and consump-
tion) is that, if treatments induce migration, they may cause subjects to face different prices. Such
differences in prices could cause the study to over- (or under-)state the the real value of estimated
impacts. On the other hand, deflating values to control-group prices is not straightforward, for at
least two reasons: study subjects may alter the quality of products purchased in ways not captured
by the study, therefore giving the appearance of price impacts; and study subjects may earn in-
comes in more expensive locations but intend for part of that income may be consumed—by the
subject themselves, or by family members to which they remit income—in their place of origin.
To address these concerns, we will report as a robustness check an analysis of primary outcomes
(3)–(5) that uses control-group prices to deflate these values. This will be particularly important
to the interpretation of the study results if treatments have effects on migration.
Appendix D.2.2 Defining Secondary outcomes
We propose to analyze three families of secondary outcome: one which speaks to alternative mea-
sures of beneficiary welfare; a second that speaks to wealth effects that may indicate likely long-term
benefits; and a third family that highlights key mechanisms of interest.
1. Alternative measures of beneficiary welfare
Within this family, we consider the following alternative measures of beneficiary well-being:
(a) Subjective well being: Index of responses to B10_swb_happiness and B10_swb_lifesatisfaction,
constructed as the average of z-scores.
(b) Mental health: Index of section B11 responses. Z-score of the simple average across all
questions for each beneficiary.
(c) Beneficiary-specific consumption expenditures (sum of values from Section B08). This
outcome will be winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile, and we will take the inverse
hyperbolic sine transformation of this as the primary measure.
2. Household net wealth, and its components
Like productive assets, the accumulation and protection of household wealth. Conditional on
this, households’ access to borrowing opportunities—viewed as a measure of their financial
access—may be a mechanism through which the interventions studied are multiplied. Given
this welfare ambiguity, we propose to analyze both total household net (non-land) wealth, as
well as stocks of savings and debt, taken individually.
(a) Household net non-land wealth. Sum of values of household assets (H12), plus savings
value (H06), value of loans outstanding that are expected to be repaid (H08), less debt
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value (H07). This outcome will be winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile, and we will
take the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of this as the primary measure.
(b) Total value of all livestock wealth. Sum of values of household livestock assets (H12).
Specifically, summing over values derived from H12_oxen through H12_ducks in the
household instrument. This outcome will be winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles,
and we will take the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of this as the primary mea-
sure.
(c) Stock of savings. Beneficiary stock of savings, sum of values in B06. Plus household
stock of savings from analogous questions (H06). This outcome will be winsorized at the
1st and 99th percentile, and we will take the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of
this as the primary measure.
(d) Stock of debt. Beneficiary sum of borrowed amounts from all (formal and informal)
sources (B07), plus household borrowings from analogous questions (H07). This outcome
will be winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile, and we will take the inverse hyperbolic
sine transformation of this as the primary measure.
3. Cognitive and non-cognitive skills
A specific feature of the theory of change that motivates EDC’s curriculum is that a focus
not just on specific skills, but on non-cognitive attitudes and attitudes, may make that in-
tervention more likely to have persistent effects. At the same time, cash transfers may also
change, inter alia, beneficiaries’ sense of control and aspirations. To test these mechanisms,
we define the following family of secondary outcomes:
(a) Locus of control: Index of responses to B09. Z-score of the simple average across all
questions for each beneficiary.
(b) Aspirations: Index of responses to B13. Z-score of the simple average across all questions
for each beneficiary.
(c) Conscientiousness, agreeableness, and emotional stability from BFI (Section B12). Each
index is the Z-score of the simple average of the questions related to the corresponding
dimension. Following EDC’s analysis of Akaze Kanoze employers,24 we will examine
program impacts on the three most highly-rated components of the Big-Five Index from
employers’ perspective: conscientiousness, agreeableness, and emotional stability.
(d) Business knowledge. Index of B14. Z-score of the simple average across all questions for
each beneficiary.
(e) Business attitudes. Index of B15. Z-score of the simple average across all questions for
each beneficiary.
24Povec Pagel, Olaru, Alcid, and Beauvy-Sany, 2017, “Identifying cross-cutting non-cognitive skills for positive
youth development”, Final report, Education Development Center, Inc.
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Appendix D.3 Institutional Board Review (ethics approval)
Details of the procedures and of the consent process were read aloud, in Kinyarwanda, to each
respondent prior to each measurement activity.
In addition to acquiring ethical approval from RNEC, the research team has acquired approval
from the IRB at Innovations for Poverty Action, and from Georgetown University and the University
of California, San Diego
Informed consent
Participant consent for inclusion in the study can be divided into two separate components:
1. Consent for inclusion in the identification of beneficiaries. Eligible applicants to EDC’s HD
program were informed that, given oversubscription, there was a chance they would not receive
this program, but that they might receive an alternative benefit instead. Determination
of eligibility was undertaken by EDC and its HD partner organizations, and required the
collection of data regarding the socio-economic status (Ubudehe) of households, and the ages
and education levels of youth in the household. The collection of these details was required
for enrollment in the study sample.
2. Consent for the collection of socio-economic data, via questionnaire, which included details of
savings, consumption, and nutritional outcomes. Households were informed that participation
in this questionnaire was not required for inclusion in any of the programs under study.
Households were also informed of the opportunity to decline to answer any specific question
within the questionnaire.
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